



MSI PATCH SHEET

Eisenhower Document
Research Rpt 1987
(Proutt - Andrews, ETC)

15 Aug '87

Bill,

Here's what I've got, so far.

Comments?

I'll be back Sept 9. Hope to
hear from you then.

Ron

24 July 1987

Hi John,

Here's some more "stuff". Please critique and let me know what you think. As I discussed with you, Moore & Graham also have a copy of this. When completed, I would appreciate it if you would send it to Fletch. Or, if you wish, you can send him this preliminary version just to keep his interest up. Sending it now, along with a list of areas warranting further research, just might be a good idea.

According to the Congressional Record, the Psychological Strategy Board was originated on June 20, 1951, with Gordon Gray as Director. The Board was composed of Gray, the CIA Director, the Undersecretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Board was abolished on September 3, 1953, by President Eisenhower and its functions were transferred to the Operations Coordination Board. The OCB was retained on January 11, 1960 and abolished on February 18, 1961. Hope this helps.

Although I have seen no evidence to support my belief that the MJ12 document is being systematically reviewed/investigated, I can't help but believe Moore & Co. are doing so. But, just in case they aren't, and if they are, to assist them, I propose we each add to the following and indicate who's going to do what. I see the following areas warranting further research:

1. Check out all U.S. typewriter manufacturers circa 1952 re:
 - a. Can they identify the font?
 - b. Was it in use on or before 1952? If so, what typewriter used it?
 - c. Were those typewriters used in either the White House or the Pentagon
2. Need DoD organization chart of 1947 & 1952.
3. MJ12 members must have left reams of data--where is it?
4. Recheck all "old" UFO writings in view of MJ12.
5. Recheck with Truman's daughter, Ike's son, Carter, Ford, Nixon, ??? re MJ12
6. How was the 1950 crash trajectory determined?
7. What significant U.S./world activity was going on during the first week of July 1947 and the

first week of December 1950?

8. Who would the current members of MJ12 be?
9. Does it matter?
10. Is "once on MJ12, always on MJ12" a viable position? If so, who would have had to have been on it? (I can think that the DCI, Secy of Defence, as a minimum, would be.) Contact all living ex-DCI & ex-Secy of DoD.
11. Where/who/when - need a definitive statement of what we (Moore, Shendera, Friedman, Graham, Regehr, and Andrews) have done & are doing. What sensitive areas/contacts should we avoid? E.g. yours with Hough/Doolittle.

John, I firmly believe that we all should get together and plan our course of action, share all our results, determine what should and should not be "released to the public", look out for pitfalls, etc.

Oh well, enough of my yammering. Give Darlene a hug from Syd & Me, will you?

Your friend,
Ron

12. Was there a significant number (i.e. "upsurge") of UFO activity in 1952?
13. How are Executive Order nos assigned?

5 August 1987

MAJESTIC TWELVE--FRAUD OR FORTUNE?

An overview of the validity of a document purportedly prepared by a select government committee to brief then-President-elect Dwight David Eisenhower.

The document may be one of the most significant documents ever on the subject of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO) and the involvement of the United States government in the coverup of the recovery of a crashed alien UFO and its crew.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: to examine the "BRIEFING DOCUMENT: OPERATION MAJESTIC TWELVE", referred to herein as the document; to present and evaluate what external information is available to refute or substantiate the document; and to provide a brief biography of the members of the Majestic 12 committee.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

The document consists of eight pages (a cover, four pages of text, a listing of appendixes, and Appendix A) and is included, in its entirety, as Appendix A of this paper.

CRITIQUE

I am indebted to Col. L. Fletcher Prouty, (USAF ret.) for his comments (via John Andrews), many of which are included unchanged in the following.

1. PROBLEM: The code name "MAJIC" is used on virtually every page, possibly as an abbreviation for "majestic". One problem is that the code name for the US government's breaking of the Japanese code of WWII was "MAGIC"--phonetically identical with "MAJIC". According to Col. Prouty, "I doubt very much that anyone would have used a code that could be so easily confused, phonetically, with that major program, i.e. MAGIC. It is too hard to get a good code word and there are so many rules about them that I can't see this phonetic problem slipping through the system." (emphasis added)

REBUTTAL: Dual code names are not that uncommon for several reasons, the first being obfuscation. One successful technique for confusing the uninitiated is to deliberately introduce false leads. In the case of MAJIC/MAGIC, an appropriate response to someone that did not possess the requisite "need-to-know" would be, "Of course, we did not cease our codebreaking analysis activities with the cessation of hostilities. To reveal much of the information, even today, would severely compromise the security of our current related activities."

One example of dual code name usage is "DART". "DART" is a code name of four different projects (two USAF, one USA, and one USN) and an acronym for 11 different devices/techniques.

However, the use of a dual code name is not the only rebuttal to the use of MAJIC. The USAF sent radar tapes from AC & W radars of Detachment 4 in Sinop, Turkey. The unit was there (in 1983) under the cover of TUSLOG, or the Turkish-US Logistics organization. The tapes were going to "MAJIC-12", a Special Studies Project group within the NSC.

2. PROBLEM: Again, from Col. Prouty, "Too many 'Eyes Only'. About six times on one sheet of paper. This is over-doing it and is not typical. This is too structured on that subject. For 'Eyes Only' the document must be carried by a special messenger. This means it does not get out of channels. So all you have to do is stamp it 'Eyes Only' once and the receivers know precisely what to do with it."

REBUTTAL: As with many classified documents, this one was typewritten and the security stamps were applied after the typing. The typewritten copy has "Eyes Only" only in those places where it would be appropriate; i.e., at the top and bottom of the page, in the title to signify that President-elect Eisenhower was privy to the data, and in the warning note. The stamped data, at top and bottom, also carried the "Eyes Only" notation. The current policy of marking classified documents requires that each data entity be marked with the appropriate classification level, in addition to the markings of the highest security level at the top and bottom of each page. The "T52-EXEMPT (E)" does not refer to "exempt from downgrading" as is the current practice, but exempts those persons on the "Top Secret" list from access.

3. PROBLEM: Again, from Col. Prouty, "The 'mechanically transcribed' bit looks phoney. The Xerox process did not come in until much later, and what would it have been in 1952? This is just a briefing sheet. It did not need all that security. It is going to stay in the hands of the briefing officer, in this case Adm. Hillenkoetter."

REBUTTAL: "Mechanically transcribed" could refer to several techniques, the most obvious one being transcription in the same manner as that used by court reporters. This also fits in context, "...or the taking of written or mechanically transcribed notes...." Another would be a recording (wire?) of the briefing.

4. PROBLEM: Eisenhower resented being constantly asked to involve himself in unnecessary detail as is done in

this briefing. According to Col. Prouty, "Two or three minutes, off hand, would have done the job."

REBUTTAL: It only takes two or three minutes to read the entire three-pages of substance. But more importantly, there is no mention of the group's asking Ike to become involved. Quite the contrary; "...the Majestic-12 Group remains of the unanimous opinion that imposition of the strictest security precautions should continue without interruption into the new administration. At the same time, contingency plan MJ-1949-04P/78 (Top Secret - Eyes Only) should be held in continued readiness...." (emphasis added)

5. PROBLEM: Col. Prouty seems to believe that because the public record reveals that Truman, Eisenhower, and Secretary of State Acheson met on 18 Nov 52 for a briefing on the world situation, that this would make a forger's task easy.

REBUTTAL: Of course. Equally valid is Col. Prouty's own comments regarding a two-hour cabinet meeting held on July 16, 1954, "The system then in practice was to have topics discussed in reverse order of classification with the lowest first and the highest last. Then as the first subjects were finished those people would be invited to leave until the final group was a very tight, top security unit."

6. PROBLEM: Why did Hillenkoetter make the briefing instead of Gen. Smith, especially in light of Smith's being both an old friend of Ike's and the current DCI?

REBUTTAL: I don't know. However, it just could (might still?) be that membership on MJ12 was a lifelong task; i.e. Hillenkoetter would remain MJ1 until his death.

7. PROBLEM: Why "disc-shaped aircraft" and not "objects"?

REBUTTAL: Mr. Kenneth Arnold, the civilian pilot who first observed an event (24 June 1947) that would hallmark the UFO controversy for years to come, referred to them as aircraft. The press popularized his description of them as being "saucer shaped" and coined the term "flying saucers". This term was (and still is in some circles) in vogue until the USAF coined the more accurate phrase "Unidentified Flying Objects" (UFO).

Another possibility is that the document is internally consistent or more revealing than a cursory reading would indicate; i.e., on page 004, there are three references to "craft" and speculation that they were "short-range reconnaissance craft". However, Dr. Menzel's considered opinion was that it was "more likely that we are dealing

with beings from another solar system entirely". This leads to two types of alien craft--aircraft and spacecraft. Hence, the use of the term "aircraft".

7. PROBLEM: The use of the term "in the public media" is claimed to be a sophomoric statement.

REBUTTAL: None, unless the military refers to internal documents/publications as "media". In context, "the first to gain widespread attention in the public media" it may not be too unrealistic a phrase if the MJ12 author(s) knew of other, military, sightings that had not reached the public. And this just may be what is alluded to. 1947 to 1952 was a very active period.

8. PROBLEM: "Different elements of the military" is not normal usage.

REBUTTAL: None.

9. PROBLEM: "National Defense" in lieu of "National Security" as used in the remainder of the document.

REBUTTAL: None.

10. PROBLEM: The phrase "several attempts to utilize aircraft" seems contrived. Were aircraft actually utilized in this sense?

REBUTTAL: The author knows of several instances where USAF fighters/interceptors were futile in their attempts to fire on UFO. Wayne C. Gatlin (USAF ret.) flew missions in pursuit of UFO.

11. PROBLEM: The use of "Roswell Army Air Base" in lieu of the proper designation "Roswell Army Air Force Base".

REBUTTAL: None, unless one considers the possibility that Adm. Hillenkoetter was, because of his Navy background, not remembering the precise term 5 years later.

12. PROBLEM: The sentence "a secret operation...to assure recovery" seems contrived since all they had to do was go out and pick it up with a truck.

REBUTTAL: According to eyewitnesses, the object was discovered on 2 July. The authorities were notified on 6 or 7 July. The "secret operation" was initiated on 7 July and in addition to recovering all physical evidence, included USAF complicity to deceive the FBI as well as the "public media". Why else would Gen. Twining fly to New Mexico in the summer--to recover a crashed weather balloon?

13. PROBLEM: The next sentence, "During the course of this operation...", leads one to believe the recovery took a considerable period of time.

REBUTTAL: The operation or recovery possibly did take weeks. The recovery alone took several days. After the debris were received at Wright Field and a preliminary analysis conducted, there may have been further orders to initiate a detailed and comprehensive search, including re-interviewing all the witnesses to positively confirm that no debris were remaining outside AMC possession. I sincerely hope that if the event occurred as related that the government officials would consider it worthy of more than a cursory search of the immediate area over a few days.

14. PROBLEM: There is some concern that ejection systems for aircraft did not exist in 1947.

REBUTTAL: An ejection system was installed in the German He 162A "Salamander" (a single-seat jet fighter) in 1944, and in the first U.S. jet fighter, the Lockheed P-80, in August 1945.

15. PROBLEM: "The wreckage of the craft was also removed to several different locations." Why would this be done?

REBUTTAL: According to eyewitness accounts, the debris recovered from "Mac" Brazel's property (presumed to be a weather balloon) was transferred to Wright Field, Ohio. Possibly the remainder of the craft (found about 2 miles east) was found later (...during the course of the investigation...) and shipped to Sandia as was the debris from the 1950 crash.

16. PROBLEM: "Civilian and military eyewitnesses..." Were there any? And how about the "debriefing"? By whom? Who had the authority? The Presidential order is dated Sept. 24, more than 2 months later.

REBUTTAL: Actually, there were quite a few eyewitnesses. Jesse Marcel Jr. (son of Major Jesse Marcel, Roswell AAFB Intelligence Officer) was one civilian eyewitness. In addition, research has discovered at least 31 other civilian eyewitnesses to the recovery. As a matter of fact, many of them are still alive! Part of the debriefing was conducted by General Ramey and/or his staff from Eighth Air Force Headquarters at Fort Worth, Texas. As Commanding General over RAAFB, General Ramey certainly had the authority. General Twining was also in New Mexico the day after the "...secret operation was begun...". According to White House and Pentagon records, there was also considerable activity in Washington starting on 8 July.

17. PROBLEM: "...a misguided weather research balloon..." How do you misguide a balloon floating in the air?

REBUTTAL: I do not know how to misguide a balloon floating in the air. Let us presume that the winds, when the balloon was launched, were blowing from north to south. If after the balloon was launched they shifted to now blow from east to west, what terminology would aptly fit? Isn't "misguided" sufficient? One other point to consider--in 1947, unlike today, most Americans believed their government officials. If an Army general said something, it was believed!

18. PROBLEM: How does Dr. Bush get orders early enough to come up with a consensus on 19 Sept, when the EO isn't signed until 24 Sept.?

REBUTTAL: Records clearly indicate that General Twining (among others in the military) was actively involved in the investigation of "flying discs" before the EO. Because of Dr. Bush's involvement in many highly classified activities during the war, most notably the Manhattan Project, he seems to be a logical choice for this type of activity.

19. PROBLEM: "...a short range reconnaissance craft" conflicts with Dr. Menzel's work in the next paragraph. General Smith would have demanded this conflict be resolved.

REBUTTAL: The craft was deemed a short range reconnaissance craft because of the "...size and the apparent lack of any identifiable provisioning." Dr. Menzel's work was in areas other than aircraft analysis. However, please do not be misled into believing that the MJ12 knew all the answers. It could very well be that they, too, were puzzled by this (apparent) contradiction. But is there a conflict? It seems logical to have a large "spacecraft" and a small "scout"; e.g. Saturn Apollo/LEM.

20. PROBLEM: When did the term "extraterrestrial" enter into the vernacular?

REBUTTAL: Unknown. What is known is that the term was in use (Lockyer "Heavens" ed. 3) in 1868.

21. PROBLEM: "...certain that these craft..." This briefing is about one craft. Now it is plural.

REBUTTAL: One possibility for this and many more of the puzzling statements in this document is that between the July 1947 crash and the November 1952 briefing, the MJ12 learned something as a result of their analysis/study. For example, on the very next page, reference is made to

another vehicle's crash/recovery. Also, you are reminded that "On 07 July, 1947 (sic) a secret operation was begun..." I would hope that in the intervening 5 years the MJ12 had learned something!

22. PROBLEM: All of this writing is terrible. "...Mars was and remains a possibility..." At the Truman and Eisenhower White House? Never!

REBUTTAL: None.

23. PROBLEM: How about the terms "...method of propulsion..." and "...method of transmission of the power source..." These are not 1947 terms.

REBUTTAL: What terms were used in 1952, the year of the briefing?

24. PROBLEM: "...the propulsion system was completely destroyed by the explosion which caused the crash..." Hardly. As a result of numerous investigations of aircraft accidents, one thing that survives, even in pieces, is the engine or engines and their parts. They do not just disappear in smoke.

REBUTTAL: None that we have that are operational disappear. However, there are test "aircraft" under development that use mirrors to deflect ground-based laser energy as a power source. Also consider that in 1947/1952, we had no solid-state electronics or fiber optics--both common on today's state-of-the-art aircraft.

25. PROBLEM: What explosion? Nobody said it exploded above ground.

REBUTTAL: The Roswell AAFB Intelligence Officer, Major Jesse A. Marcel, claimed that the object exploded in the air.

26. PROBLEM: Project SIGN might have come from a poor printing of Project SIGMA or that it might have been Project SINE.

REBUTTAL: The Code Name "SIGN" was assigned by orders of Major General L.G. Craigik to Lt. General N. F. Twining on 30 December 1947. Project GRUDGE, the follow-on to Project SIGN, was initiated in early 1949, possibly with the proviso that USAF personnel evaluate UFO reports from the premise that they (UFO) could not exist. Project BLUE BOOK was initiated in early 1952.

27. PROBLEM: "...AMC whose role was to pass along certain types of information through channels..." is the last thing you do with an "Eyes Only" project...not through channels.

REBUTTAL: True--as far as it goes. However, how does the MJ12 get any more data and retain their cover? On 30 December 1947, by command of the Chief of Staff and signed by Major General L.C. Craigik, Twining and his AMC were established as the "official" investigatory group with a security classification of "restricted" and a code name of "SIGN". The loop is closed.

28. PROBLEM: Project GRUDGE is not typical and means something.

REBUTTAL: True. There is some indication that the code name "GRUDGE" was chosen because of the USAF desire to disprove the existence of UFO, whereas "SIGN" seemed to be a legitimate research/analysis project.

29. PROBLEM: "...following a long trajectory..." Where did this come from? Who saw a long trajectory and how was it determined? This is before ADC and FAA radars.

REBUTTAL: (Gee, Fletch, for somebody who professes Ike didn't like details, howzcum you wanted 'em to put in so many?) Dr. La Paz was the US renowned expert in meteor trajectory analysis in 1947. Coincidentally, Dr. La Paz was working at

30. PROBLEM: "...almost totally incinerated..." Great imagination. How did the local rancher discover it if it had been "almost totally incinerated"?

REBUTTAL: Nobody said a local rancher did discover this crash. This one occurred in 1950, almost 525 miles southeast of the Roswell crash. A completely different crash.

31. PROBLEM: "...motives and intentions of these visitors..." Contrived, as is "...surveillance activity of these craft..."

REBUTTAL: None.

32. PROBLEM: Executive Order #092447 is just the date Sept. 24, 1947. This is not a "Special Classified Executive Order number.

REBUTTAL: None.

EXTERNAL DATA

External data supporting the validity of the document are somewhat limited. However there is a preponderance of data that corroborate the information contained therein. This is not an attempt to recapitulate the information

presented in "THE ROSWELL INCIDENT" (recommended reading for a reasonably complete story of this event) except as is necessary for continuity.

1. "MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TWINING" dated July 14, 1954. This memorandum was prepared by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, and is to notify Twining that the MJ-12 Special Studies Project briefing will take place during, rather than following, an already scheduled White House meeting on July 16.

PROBLEM: The memorandum is unsigned, and the last sentence is out of character for Cutler.

REBUTTAL: The memorandum, obtained from the National Archives, is a carbon copy, thus no signature; neither are there initials to support it. Research has discovered, however, that General Cutler was actually out of the country when the memorandum was prepared, with written instructions to his staff to "Keep things moving out of my in basket." As to the "assumption" that Twining will concur, this may not be too unrealistic in view of the short notice (less than 2 days). One interesting point is that the memorandum is classified "TOP SECRET RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION". The only logical reason for this classification would be the tie-in between the NSC and MJ12.

2. "THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1954", shows 2 hours reserved for a cabinet meeting (from 9.00 to 11.00) and lunch starting at 1.00 and continuing for the remainder of the day.

PROBLEM: No mention of meeting with the NCS/MJ12 Special Studies Project.

REBUTTAL: Again, according to Prouty, "A two-hour meeting was not common. It had to be something special. Ike may not have kept the full cabinet there. The system then in practice was to have topics discussed in reverse order of classification with the lowest first and the highest last. Then as the first subjects were finished those people would be invited to leave until the final group was a very tight, top security unit. This makes the meetings longer but holds the best for last." As to the long lunch, Ike probably played golf.

3. This is a teletype from the Dallas FBI office (the closest one to Fort Worth/General Ramey) to the Cincinnati FBI office (the closest one to Wright Field), in which it is reported that "telephonic conversation between their office (i.e., Eighth Air Force) and Wright Field had not borne out this belief (i.e., that the 'object found resembles a high altitude weather balloon with a radar reflector')"

PROBLEM: None. This confirms that the FBI was being held "in the wings" in anticipation of their being needed to effect further cover-up of the story.

4. This is a page-one article from the July 8, 1947 edition of "The Albuquerque Tribune" headlined "AAF Trying to Find Out What Discs Are, General Says Here", in which Twining is reported to have said, "The mysterious objects definitely are not the result of experiments of the air forces....The AAF does not have any plane, guided missile or other aerial device under development which could possibly be mistaken for a saucer or formation of flying discs....Some of the witnesses evidently saw something, but we don't know what we are investigating."

PROBLEM: None. Two items of curiosity though. First, according to his appointment calendar, Twining was in Washington, DC. Second, why did Twining make any reference to a "formation of flying discs"? Is this a slip of the tongue, is Twining alluding to Kenneth Arnold's "formation" sighting of 24 June of ~~the previous year~~, or is Twining intentionally corroborating that there were other discs in the area, possibly looking for their downed companion(s) or to a multiple-disc collision?

September 24, 1947.

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT ON SEPTEMBER 24:

Secretary Forrestal and I visited the President at 11:30 a.m. I opened the conversation after the usual greetings by stating that Mr. Forrestal wished me to take the post of Chairman of the Research and Development Board, and the President immediately said "so do I." I then told the President that while I would like to be relieved after some seven years of voluntary government effort, I would nevertheless be willing to go on and do the job, but that one thing seemed to stand in the way. I told him that I could not do the job appropriately and call in the needed aid from outside government unless the scientists in particular in the country felt that I had the confidence of the President. The President said he did not see how they could think otherwise, that I certainly had his confidence and that this was indicated by the fact that he wished me to take on the post, and he inquired how any other idea could have arisen. I told him that inasmuch as he had not called me in for anything for a year, and that since the last report^{that} was made on the future of science in this country was made by someone else, scientists naturally gathered that I was not in his confidence. There ensued a discussion of the manner in which the Steelman report was handled, and I believe that the President had not realized previously that the board he set up really had nothing to do with the preparation of the Steelman report. However, he stated that certainly in the new post, if it had not been true recently in the past, I would be rather frequently in contact and that if there was an impression that I did not have his confidence he felt that that impression would soon be corrected by future relations. I then told the President that I felt that this time I ought to take the post with the definite understanding that I would relinquish it in about a year or perhaps less. We had some discussion of this and he finally agreed that it would be a good thing, after the Board was well on its way, to revolve the chairmanship at reasonable intervals. We talked about possible successors. Mr. Forrestal led this part of the discussion and stated that he felt that before the end of my term of office he and I ought to seek a successor agreeable to the President and see that he was indoctrinated.

We also discussed the science legislation. At first the President was very positive on this subject, and indicated that he felt that Congress had tried to take out of his control things that reasonably belong under his control. He bawled the fiasco on Senator Smith, but I explained to him that Smith had, in fact,

been the means of putting through the Senate an amendment that moved in the President's direction. I also told him that Mr. Webb and I had been attempting to bring Congress and the President together, and I stated that I felt sure that I could write a bill that would be agreeable to the President and that I felt would be a good sound bill and that would probably be agreeable to Congress. He asked me how it would be phrased and I outlined a board appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, a director appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate after hearing the views of the board, a provision that the director would operate the business affairs of the Foundation under the usual checks and balances, but he would be subject on general policies to the board, with a provision that no grants could be made unless both the board and the director agreed. At this point the President stated that in order that control should be had by the President in appropriate fashion over matters in the Executive Branch it was essential that the board be advisory only. I thereupon said that I felt when we came to the giving away of public money we had an exception to the general rule that he indicated, and that in particular I felt that both he and the director needed the protection of a board having authority, for otherwise there would not be adequate defense against political pressure for inappropriate grants to various universities. We had some further discussion on this matter in which the Secretary joined, and I believe that I convinced the President on this point. We had also some discussion about the danger that was in the President's mind that the board would be simply a log-rolling affair to make grants to things that its members were interested in. I told him I had no fear of this, having been through the question during the war, and that I felt there was complete protection against any such affair if he appointed on the board not only scientists from universities but also a strong group of representative citizens interested only in furthering the public welfare, and that moreover my own experience had been that scientists of repute such as he would appropriately appoint leaned over backward when grants to their own organizations were concerned. I think he felt satisfied on this matter. We left this whole affair of the science legislation in this form: I am to consult with Mr. Webb to tell him of this conversation. We will attempt to outline a possible bill that might be accepted. Then Secretary Forrestal and Mr. Webb and I will confer on the matter and if it looks favorable we will place it before the President. Thereafter we will see whether it appears feasible to urge action on it in Congress. On this latter point we felt that we should go ahead with the matter if there was a reasonable chance of a bill being enacted that would be acceptable to the President, but, on the other hand, we felt that if it was likely to become a political football we should not open the matter.

On returning to the Defense Building in Mr. Forrestal's car we agreed that the best next step would be for the President to announce the appointment at a press conference. I stated that I would talk to Mr. Gifford and then let Mr. Forrestal know whether I am cleared to accept from that standpoint. Mr. Forrestal will draft a statement for the President for use at his press conference, bringing into it explicitly some statement to inform the public that I am in the confidence of the President, and will suggest it to the President. On coming out of the White House Mr. Forrestal when met by the press simply told them we had discussed the appointment with the President but the matter remained in the President's hands.

V. Bush.