

MSI PATCH SHEET

Lay, James S.

July 14, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TWINING

NSC/MJ-12 Special Studies Project SUBJECT:

The President has decided that the MJ-12 SSP briefing should take place during the already scheduled White House meeting of July 16, rather than following it as previously intended. More precise arrangements will be explained to you upon arrival. Please alter your plans accordingly.

Your concurrence in the above change of arrangements is assumed.

> ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

from

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Record Group Ro. 20 341, Records of \$35 bandquarters United

States Air Force

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

January 23, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Regular National Security Council Meetings

The President has decided to continue the regularly scheduled meetings of the National Security Council on Wednesdays at 3:30 p.m.. Therefore, it is requested that you set aside this time, with the understanding that you will be advised in advance each week as to whether there will be a meeting.

Attendance at these Council meetings will normally be limited, for the time being, to the statutory Council members, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President, and the Executive Secretary and his Deputy. Other officials may be invited to attend, on a case-by-case basis, if matters of direct concern to them are involved.

The President has also directed that the first item on each regular Council meeting shall be a weekly briefing on the situation by the Director of Central Intelligence.

JAMES S. LAY, JR / Executive Secretary

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

July 14, 1954

MEMORANDIM FOR: The Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT:

Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program

REFERENCE:

Memo for Gen. Cutler from Addressees,

same subject, undated (received July 14,

1954)

The President has been advised by me of the reference memorandum and of its conclusion that "no revisions seem appropriate in NSC Action No. 779."

Accordingly, the President has decided that action by the National Security Council regarding the reference memorandum is not necessary, and that this matter should be handled through regular procedures, including normal budgetary review to the extent required.

The President has also asked that the Atomic Energy Commission, after consultation with the Department of Defense, transmit an appropriate reply to the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in response to the report of the Research and Development Subcommittee on this subject which was transmitted to the President, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

> JAMES S. LAY, JR. Executive Secretary

THE DIVISION OF CLASSIFICATION, U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, HAS DETERMINED THAT THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NO RESTRICTED DATA OR FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA. ERDA HAS NO OBJECTION TO ITS DECLASSIFICATION.

REVIEWED BY

DECLASSIFIED Authority MR 88-25"/ 1126/8 NLE Date

lim. Dubler

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

January 23, 1953

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JAMES S. LAY, JR

Executive Secretary

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT:

300th NSC Meeting

REFERENCE:

Agenda for the 300th Meeting of the National Security Council, dated October 8, 1956

The 300th NSC Meeting originally scheduled for Thursday, October 11, 1956 at 9:00 a.m. has been postponed to Friday October 12, at 9:00 a.m.

> JAMES S. LAY, JR. Executive Secretary

The Secretary of the Treasury cc: The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

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James S. Lay, Jr.
Exec. Secy., National
Security Council
Washington

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CONTENTS

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8/11 - To: 1) AFODC. Info. 2) AF(
Prep reply for sig C/S, USAF
C/S has the original. JCS.

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Memo For: C/S, USAF (Other Servi Chiefs) to attend NSC meeting in Coron Rm of White House, Thurs, 12 Aug at 8:30 am. 1 Attach. SECRET Cp No. 40 (Agenda). DCS/O, AF.

8/11 - To: AFOPD. Attn: Col Kinsey. Info and/or file. C/S has seen. JCS.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

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January 23, 1953

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JAMES S. LAY, JR Executive Secretary

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- 1. This is a statutory agency, in the Executive Office of the President, established by the National Security Act of 1947. It is, in effect, a policy committee operating at the Presidential level but is not in the chain of command. It is organized on policy advisory lines but only recommends to the President who approves the issue of policy directives. Its principal function is to advise the President on the integration of foreign, domestic, and military policies relating to the national security. Its present staff includes an Executive Secretary and 22 other persons.
- 2. The membership, by statute, as amended, is the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and others designated by the President with the consent of the Senate. The Director for Eutual Security is presently a member.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency are named advisors to the Council by statute.

3. Foreign policy is represented by the Secretary of State and supposedly the Director of Mutual Security, military policy by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS and the CIA. The Chairman of the NSRB apparently was intended to represent domestic policy but the value of this representation can be related to the effectiveness of that organization and its leadership.

There appears to be insufficient representation in terms of the domestic impact of foreign and military policy or the domestic economic and financial support given those policies.

The composition and operation of the Council should be sufficiently flexible to meet any basic changes in the functions and responsibilities of related agencies and the nature of the problems that have arisen from the experience of the past five years in operating the Council.

- 4. The principal problems of the Council fall under these general classifications:
 - a. Composition and organization
 - b. Domination of policy decisions by the agency in the area where the problem falls
 - c. Effective implementation of policies
 - d. Limitation on policy and staff work predicated on the levels and applied time of the agency individuals assigned to work on the problems before the Council; time delays and lack of action on program projects.
 - e. A general absence of relating policy decisions to the feasibility of implementation or the costs.
 - 5. Recommendations with respect to the above-listed problems
 - a. Reconsider the basic representation provided by the statute. Possibly eliminate the Director of Mutual Security and, depending on the form of the reorganization of NSRB and ODM, include an individual who may head both ODM and NSRB. The latter has a statutory place on the Council as Chairman of the NSRB. Consider strengthen-

ing the representation on the Council by one or more additional representatives of the domestic policy problems related to national security.

- b. It is reported that policy decisions tend to be dominated by the agency in the area where the problem falls, primarily due to inadequate staff consideration by other agencies and their representatives.
- one. The Executive Secretary must serve all members of the Council, and implementation authority given an Executive Secretary or even an individual member suggests government by committee. There are practical obstacles to designating one member of the Council to coordinate implementation partly through other equal agencies.

The program for Council consideration and staff activity should be established by the President, supplemented by acceptable program recommendations of the member agencies.

d. There has been considerable difficulty and delay in getting action on NSC projects in the Departments to which they are assigned and in other Departments of interest.

An attempt was made to raise the level of the policy staff work by higher status representatives designated by each agency. The difficulty here is that it turned out to be a part-time effort on the part of

those assigned, while full-time effort and application are indicated.

This could be satisfied by the appointment of "Special Assistants" to the head of each agency for assignment to the NSC Office of the President on a full-time basis and with full recourse to all of the resources of the agency. Preferably he should not be a career man and he should not solely represent the Department from which he is appointed but primarily represent National Security and freely collaborate with similar representatives of other agencies.

There should be a flexible provision for necessary civilian consultants.

Cooperative staff studies should include factual estimates and consideration of means of implementation.

6. The 1951 report of the Brookings Institute on the Administration of Foreign Policy and Foreign Aid suggested a full-time Vice Chairman of the NSC. This is open to the objection that to function as an executive at this level he would have to intervene between the President and members of his cabinet.

J. M. Dodge

December 1, 1952 Amended December 22, 1952

TOP SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 51

RECORD OF ACTION

by the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

at its

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIFTH MEETING

July 16, 1953

NOTE: The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget participated in the Council action below.

ACTION NUMBER

SUBJECT

853. V PROJECT SOLARIUM

- a. Noted and discussed oral presentations on three alternative basic national security policies, by the Task Forces constituted under Project Solarium.
- <u>b.</u> Noted the President's remarks on the presentations, including the great importance he attaches to the work of Project Solarium and his commendation on the excellence of the presentations by the Task Forces.
- 6. (6)

Referred the presentations, and the reports upon which they were based, to the NSC Staff for preparation of summaries of the principal points thereof, in consultation with members of each Task Force, and report back to the Council for further consideration and instructions.

NSC ACTION 853

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 14

July 22, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT:

Project Solarium

REFERENCE:

NSC Action No. 853-c

In accordance with NSC Action No. 853-c, summaries of Project Solarium presentations and written reports, prepared by the NSC staff and concurred in by Solarium Task Force representatives, are submitted herewith as a basis for discussion by the Council at its meeting on July 30, together with a summary of the principle points made during discussion following the presentation to the National Security Council on July 16, 1953.

As background, there follows a brief summary of the instructions to the Task Forces defining the three alternative policies which they were asked to develop:

Alternative "A". (p.1)

a. The policy of the United States, as elaborated more fully in NSC 153/1, would be:

- (1) To maintain over a sustained period armed forces to provide for the security of the United States and to assist in the defense of vital areas of the free world;
- (2) To continue to assist in building up the economic and military strength and cohesion of the free world; and
- (3) Without materially incrasing the risk of general war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviets and their satellites by political, economic and psychological measures.

TOP SECRET

June 30, 1960

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AN ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL*

By James S. Lay, Jr. and Robert H. Johnson

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In a little less than thirteen years the National Security Council has been transformed from a brief statement of purposes in the National Security Act of 1947 into a well-established part of the governmental machinery. Two Presidents have endorsed, supported and fully utilized it. The organization and procedures of the Council have been adjusted to meet the individual needs and desires of each of the Presidents who have presided over it as well as the requirements of a changing world situation. However, the Council mechanism has also evolved continuously; each stage in its development has been built upon the stage before.

Even in advance of World War II there were individuals who saw the need for improved means of correlating our foreign policy with our military and economic capabilities. However, it was the deficiencies exposed by the pre-Pearl Harbor period of diplomatic and military maneuver, the handling of wartime problems involving relationships between foreign, military and domestic policies, and the development of policies for the postwar period that demonstrated to many individuals, in and out of government, the need for better machinery for relating our foreign and our military policies. During the wartime period General George C. Marshall is understood to have been an early advocate of improved top-level coordinating machinery.

* This history deals only with the unclassified organization and procedures of the National Security Council. It does not include the substance of papers or discussions on national security matters within the NSC organization because they are of a confidential nature involving matters of Presidential privilege and because most of them must remain classified for security reasons. Obviously, it would be inappropriate for this history to contain any individual appraisal of the many distinguished officials who have been associated with the NSC organization. However, it should be recognized that the organization and procedures described herein were largely governed by the requirements of the subject matter and of the individuals involved in the work of the Council during the various stages of its history. In fact, the purpose of the organization and procedures on which this history concentrates is to serve the officials of the Council in dealing with the substantive problems and issues affecting the security of the United States now and in the foreseeable future.

Reorganization of the Council and the Staff

In the course of Mr. Cutler's study of the Council organization he consulted regularly with the President and solicited views from a number of people both inside and outside the government who had knowledge of and, in many cases, direct experience with the Council mechanism. Included in these consultations were former Council and Senior Staff Members and the former and present Executive Secretary. In addition to obtaining the individual views of such knowledgeable persons orally or in writing (or both), Mr. Cutler met with small groups of them in all-day sessions. Mr. Cutler also consulted with and obtained the assistance of the Director, Bureau of the Eudget, and his staff and the President's Advisory Committee on Covernment Organization.

On March 16, 1953, he submitted his report to the President who approved it the following day. The report recommended many changes, but because it also incorporated all of the basic instructions governing the organization and operation of the Council and its subordinate bodies, it confirmed a number of already existing arrangements as well.

After reaffirming the Presidential-advisory character of the Council, the report found that no changes were required in the existing statutory statement of the functions of the Council.

On the subject of attendance at Council meetings the report stated that, as a general rule no more than eight persons should have the right to participate as Council members. The report distinguished the several types of attendance at Council meetings, establishing five different categories of attendance: (a) statutory members, (b) participant members, (c) advisors (statutory and other), (d) observers, and (e) staff. Within the category of "participant members" a further distinction was made between those individuals who were invited on a "standing-request" basis to attend all Council meetings until the President otherwise decided and those who were invited to attend a meeting or a part of a meeting on an "ad hoc" basis. The categories generally formalized prior practice and were of value in providing a framework within which individual decisions on attendance could be made on a flexible basis in the light of the requirements of a particular Council agenda.

The report confirmed existing arrangements as to actual Council attendance with two exceptions: (a) it provided that the statutory membership of the Chairman, NSRB, should be transferred to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization,* and (b) the Special Assistant to the President

^{*} Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 (effective June 12, 1953) abolished NSRB and transferred all of the functions of the Chairman, NSRB. (except those that it abolished altogether) to the Director, ODM.

for Cold War Planning became an Adviser to the Council while the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, was eliminated as an Observer. Thus, the Council membership was limited to a regular group of seven participants (the statutory members* and the Secretary of the Treasury). The two statutory advisers plus the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning also attended regularly. The absorption of NSRB by ODM had reduced the number of Council participants by one.

An important innovation was the provision that, if the President was unable to attend a Council meeting, the Vice President would preside in his stead.** Only in the absence of both the President and the Vice President would the Secretary of State preside. The report specified that a regular weekly meeting time should be established and ordinarily maintained.

The report explicitly rejected participation in the Council by individuals who had no departmental responsibilities. However, it provided for the appointment on an ad hoc basis of Consultants from outside the government who would, either individually or in groups, serve as informal advisers to the Council. Two examples were cited of the potential use of such consultants: (a) to consider some specific new proposals or long-range project and report to the Council (in such a case its report would be reviewed by the agencies concerned); and (b) to review for the Council a proposal developed by the Planning Board.

The Senior Staff was renamed the "Planning Board", but retained the same functions. With the exception of the elimination of NSEE, the agency representation on the Planning Board remained unchanged though the representatives of the JCS and CIA were re-designated "Advisers" rather than "Members".*** However, as Advisers they retained their right

^{*} The President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director for Mutual Security and the Director, CDM.

President Eisenhower has presided at 306 (or 90%) of the 338 Council meetings held from January 29, 1953, through June 30, 1960.

Members of the Planning Board at this time were, in addition to the Special Assistant, representatives of State, Treasury, Defense, Mutual Security and ODM. JCS, CIA and PSB were represented by Advisers. Then PSB was later abolished and the Operations Coordinating Board established, a member of the OCB Staff (usually the Executive Officer or his Deputy) was a Planning Board Adviser. As noted below, this arrangement was further amended in 1957.

to have their dissents, if any, included in Planning Board reports to the Council. As in the past, other agencies might be invited by the Chairman to attend Planning Board meetings for items of interest to them. The chairmanship of the Planning Board was assigned to the newly established Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs* instead of the Executive Secretary. This assignment was consistent with the important principle, mentioned earlier, that the Chairman of the Council's principal policy-formulating staff body should be a person without departmental ties who through a direct and close staff relationship with the President was fully cognizant of the desires and the requirements of the President.

*r. Cutler's report renamed the "Staff Assistants" the "Board Assistants". They continued, however, to have the same functions and to be chaired by a Coordinator from the NSC Staff.**

Though, apart from the change in chairmanship, the membership and functions of the Planning Board were not essentially changed by the report, the report did contain some important specifications with respect to appointment of individual Planning Board Members and Advisers. It continued the provision for nomination by the agency head and appointment by the President (after approval by the Special Assistant). It stated that each Member or Adviser should have direct access to and the personal confidence of his agency head. (Generally speaking, Planning Board members are Assistant Secretaries, or equivalent, within their departments or agencies.) Most importantly, the report specified that each Member or Adviser should:

"...have as his principal responsibility, which overrides all other duties and with which no other duty can interfere, his work with the Board, including preparation for and
attendance at meetings; yet at the same time continue
to be sufficiently in the stream of activity of his department or agency so as to be capable of representing its views."

This requirement was addressed to a problem that had appeared toward the end of the 1950-53 period. Senior Staff Members, though of high caliber and adequate rank, frequently became so absorbed in departmental responsibilities that they found it difficult to devote sufficient time and attention to NSC work. They tended to delegate real responsibility for Senior Staff work to alternates or to the head of the office within their

^{*} The functions of the Special Assistant are described in greater detail just below.

The Advisers from the three military services ceased attending Board Assistants meetings after April 1953. They continue, however, to provide support to Defense and JCS Planning Board representatives by assisting in the development of service views on the papers before the Planning Board and the Council.

Each Planning Board Member and Adviser receives a personal letter of appointment from the President.

agencies who was responsible for the particular subject matter being considered.

The report emphasized the importance of ensuring that the Board was constantly aware of the matters in which the Council was interested, though ideas for projects might germinate at any level in the organization. Finally, it stated that if conflicts of view could not be fairly resolved, they should never be suppressed or compromised, but should be reported to the Council.

The report simply listed the other existing standing committees of the Council and proposed no changes in them at that time.

One of the most important changes introduced by the report was the creation of the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Special Assistant was named the principal executive officer of the Council and Chairman of the NSC Planning Board. This change represented the designation by the President of a member of the White House Staff as his principal staff officer for national security affairs. The Executive Secretary, who had previously performed this general role, was reappointed head of the career staff of the Council and was designated to act for the Special Assistant in his absence and to advise and aid him in the performance of his duties.

The Special Assistant was made responsible for determination, subject to the President's desires, of the Council agenda, for briefing the President in advance of Council meetings, and for presenting matters for discussion at the Council meetings. As Chairman of the Planning Board he was responsible for scheduling Planning Board work and for the manner of presentation and quality of such work. He was to appoint (subject where necessary to the President's approval) such ad hoc committees, such consultants from outside the Government and such mixed governmental-non-governmental committees as might be required. He supervised the work of the NSC Staff through the Executive Secretary.

Finally, the Special Assistant was charged with bringing to the attention of the President, with recommendations for appropriate action,

^{*} It might be noted here that, with the beginning of the new Administration in 1953, responsibility for daily briefing of the President on current foreign politico-military developments was transferred from the Executive Secretary to the White House Staff Secretary. The Executive Secretary did continue to participate in the Special Assistant's briefing of the President before Council meetings.

lack of progress by an agency in carrying out any policy assigned to it; provided it was not possible to expedite performance at the Planning Board level. The report emphasized, however, that responsibility for implementation rested with the agency head concerned and that the role of the Special Assistant was, on behalf of the President, to inspect, not to evaluate or to direct. "r. Cutler was named the President's first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.*

The NSC Staff, headed by the Executive Secretary, was to continue to provide the secretariat for the Council and the Planning Board, to act as the official channel of communications for the Council and to provide, with CIA support, administrative services for the Council. The report confirmed the new arrangement under which the NSC Staff was responsible for briefing the Vice President on the matters before the Council.

In addition, as a final important change, the report provided for the strengthening of the NSC Staff by the establishment within it of a small "Special Staff" under the supervision of the Deputy Executive Secretary with, among others, the following duties: (a) independent analysis and review of each Planning Board report before its submission to the Council; (b) continuous examination of the totality of national security policies with a view to determining if gaps existed which should be filled and if important issues or anticipated developments were sufficiently explored; (c) continuing integrated evaluation of the capabilities of the free world versus the capabilities of the Soviet and Satellites, and estimates of the situation, in order to bring such evaluations and estimates before the Council; (d) providing a chairman or member of, or observer with, ad hoc non-governmental or mixed governmentalnon-governmental committees, and assistance, in recruiting such committees; and (e) keeping currently informed on the status of all national security programs and seeing that reports and pertinent information thereon were currently available (thus incorporating the functions of the Reporting Unit). The Special Staff, when it was established, was made up of two members of the existing professional staff of the Council (plus the Deputy Executive Secretary) and three additional staff officers. It continues to have, in addition to the Deputy Executive Secretary, five professional members today.

The report re-affirmed and emphasized the distinction between the Council, the Planning Board and the Special Assistant on the one hand and the NSC Staff on the other. The former group, it was recognized, was a part of and would change with changes in the Administration; the latter group, the report stated, should not be subject to change with political change.

^{*} Mr. Cutler served from March 1953 to March 1955 and again

/8 Mos. from January 1957 to July 1958. Others who have held this position have been Mr. Dillon Anderson (April 1955-August 1956); /5 Mos Mr. William H. Jackson (Acting) (September 1956-December 1956); 4 Mos and Mr. Gordon Gray (July 1958 to the present).



Federal Eurean of Investigation United States Department of Instice Washington 25, D. C.



January 13, 1950



lr. James S. Lay, Jr. Executive Secretary National Security Council Executive Office Building Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Lay:

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DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS

Agency Case

NLE Case 88-145-1/

NLE Date 7246

feel in NSC 1-18-50

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr. Executive Secretary Mational Security Council

January 13, 1950

The foregoing is being furnished to you for your confidential use and should not be given any dissemination. I wish to advise, however, that I am furnishing this information to the Attorney General, the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Division of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force.

With assurances of my highest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Attachments

1-1115812501741

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

FOR SECRET

November 24, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your direction, the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury, at a meeting on November 22 at which you presided and in which Mr. Blaisdell (for the Secretary of Commerce), the Acting Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, also participated, discussed the enclosed memorandum and its attachments concerning the military program under the NSC 68/2 approved policy on "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security".

Accordingly, pursuant to the discussion at the meeting the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Blaisdell (for the Secretary of Commerce), the Acting Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, agreed to advise you that, without prejudice to normal budgetary review of the cost estimates, they consider the proposed military program for Fiscal Year 1951, attached to the enclosed memorandum, to be generally consistent with the policies and objectives stated in NSC 68/2.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr. / Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12085, Sec. 3-402

State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979

State Dept. HARS, Date (A-17-40)

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OBLIGATIONS	1953	\$ 13,196,200,000	10,135,000,000	10,686,000,000	\$ 34,317,200,000
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

LOP SECRET

November 10, 1950

COPY NO.

NEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT:

United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea

REFFRENCE:

NSC Action No. 378

The enclosed statements of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Central Intelligence Agency, respectively, concerning the current situation in Korea, as read at the 71st Council meeting in connection with discussion of the subject, are circulated herewith for the information and record of the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.

Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11612, Sec. 3(5) and 5(D) at 24 14 15

bod letter, April 17.15

NAINE DIAGRAPH.

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