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SECURITY INFORMATION

NSC 10/2

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A REPORT  
TO THE  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

June 18, 1948

WASHINGTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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NSC 10/2

June 18, 1948

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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS  
Reference: NSC 10/1

At its 13th Meeting the National Security Council approved the Directive in NSC 10/1 subject to deletion of paragraph 3-d and amendments to paragraphs 3-a and e and 4.

The revised Directive, as approved, is circulated herewith to the Council for information and to the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate action.

Special security precautions are being taken in the handling of this report. For this reason it is suggested that each member of the Council may wish to return his copy for filing in the office of the Executive Secretary, where it will be held available upon request.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS  
Executive Secretary

Distribution:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Chairman, National Security  
Resources Board

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Auth: FD 11550

Date: 1-11-76

By: James H. Davis

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC 10/2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

on

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace:

a. A new office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.

b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.

c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency.

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d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

(1) Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.

(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.

(3) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them.

e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.

f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.

4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.

5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can

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plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.

6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.

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b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.

c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency.

d. There shall be established an Operations Advisory Committee composed of one representative of the Secretary of State and one representative of the Secretary of Defense. These representatives shall be provided assistants and staffs as necessary by their respective Secretaries. The functions of this Committee shall be:

(1) To furnish authoritative policy guidance on covert operations to the Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) To assist in the preparation of all plans for such operations. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and a member of the Operations Advisory Committee over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.

e. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

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(1) Ensuring through the Operations Advisory Committee that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities, and that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.

(2) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them.

f. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.

g. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.

4. Covert operations, in time of war or emergency when the President directs, shall be conducted under appropriate arrangements to be recommended by the Office of Special Projects in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the National Security Council.

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5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.

6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.

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3 June 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: NSC 10 (Psychological Warfare Organization). *P.S.B.*

1. Col. Giffin assisted Mr. Whitney at the briefing of Mr. Symington prior to the NSC meeting this date. Gen. Vandenberg took part in the discussion of NSC 10.
2. Gen. Vandenberg had studied Mr. Souers communication of 2 June, which forwarded a compromise proposal recommended by Mr. Lovett, Mr. Forrestal, and Mr. Dulles. Gen. Vandenberg stated he was unreservedly opposed to this proposal, since it would have the effect of setting up "another freewheeling operator" in an important aspect of Government affairs. Mr. Symington stated that it would, in effect, give the CIA administrator a job to do and then tell him how to do it, whereas the principle should be that of giving a man a job to do and then letting him do it.
3. Mr. Whitney was instructed, as proxy for Mr. Symington at the NSC meeting, to press for deferral of any decision on this matter, but, if necessary, to oppose the new proposal as tactfully as possible. Mr. Symington said that if Mr. Forrestal was solidly behind the new proposal, he (Mr. Symington) would have no choice but to accept Mr. Forrestal's decision.

*SFC*  
S. F. GIFFIN  
Colonel, USAF  
Acting Chief, World  
Survey Branch

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Per letters USAF 4 Apr. 77; OSD 24 May 77; State 5 Oct. 77; & CIA 2 Nov. 77.  
by CAS 11-9-77

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August 7, 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Gorrie

SUBJECT: NSC-CIA Task Force Project

As indicated in the notes sent to you covering yesterday's Programming Committee meeting, the subject of the Board's participation in this project was discussed by the Committee. The following recommendations are offered for your consideration: (1) that the Board's participation in this project be handled through an observer attached to the task force; (2) that recommendations regarding the formulation of the project be handled through direct contact between the Chairman and General Smith.

Since there appears to be no member of the Board's current staff who could devote the time that probably will be required for this assignment, it has been my thought that you would wish to consider Mr. Jack Schroeter for the job, in the event that you are favorably impressed after meeting him and that he, in turn, decides to come with the Board.

In discussing the project with General Smith you may wish to mention that, aside from the Board's general interest in the project, we have pressing requirements for well-grounded assumptions regarding the extent to which enemy attack may reduce the general or specific industry-by-industry production potential of the American economy. A second immediate need is for assumptions regarding the consequences of enemy attack for use in planning the post-attack rehabilitation of industrial activity.

Dal Hitchcock  
Assistant for Programming

PS: The above interests, of course, are in addition to the coordination of General Smith's project and Project Y. D.H.

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NSC 54/12 Group

# THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

JEFFREY RICHELSON

BALLINGER PUBLISHING COMPANY  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
A Subsidiary of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

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International Standard Book Number: 0-88730-024-3 (CL)  
0-88730-025-1 (PB)

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 84-24385

Printed in the United States of America

#### Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Richelson, Jeffrey.  
The United States intelligence community.

Bibliography: p.  
Includes index.

1. Intelligence service—United States. I. Title.

JK468.I6R53 1985 327.1'2'0973 84-24385

ISBN 0-88730-024-3

ISBN 0-88730-025-1 (pbk.)

four pages that list administrative, intelligence collection and production, and counterintelligence regulations.<sup>63</sup>

### INDIVIDUALS, COMMITTEES, AND OFFICES

No matter how thorough the documents and directives described above or the plans described below are in stating the responsibilities and subjects for collection and analysis, they will for several reasons be insufficient as complete guides. First, every document will leave some room for interpretation. Second, attainment of the objectives specified will require cooperation and coordination on a regular basis. Hence, it is necessary to maintain a structure that facilitates such cooperation and coordination. Third, it is necessary to see that the members of the intelligence community are performing their activities within the restrictions imposed on them—that activities planned to attain specified objectives are acceptable to higher authority. Finally, changing circumstances will require an alteration in preconceived plans and priorities.

At the top of the individual, committee, and office control system is the President and those National Security Council (NSC) committees charged with the supervision of intelligence activities. Under the Carter administration there were two such committees: the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) and the Policy Review Committee (PRC). The SCC had jurisdiction over covert operations and counterintelligence matters, and two components of the PRC were concerned with intelligence. PRC-Intelligence (PRC-1) was concerned with the preparation of a consolidated national intelligence budget and resource allocation for the entire intelligence community. PRC-Space was concerned with space matters, possibly having some responsibility for space-based reconnaissance.<sup>64</sup>

The SCC and PRC were two more of a long line of NSC committees responsible for supervising intelligence activities. Until the Nixon administration such committees were exclusively concerned with covert operations. The first of these committees was established in 1948 by NSC 10/2 and known as the 10/2 Panel. In subsequent years, as it was re-created and its membership and functions altered or maintained, it was renamed the 10/5 Panel (NSC 10/5, October 23, 1951), the Operations Coordinating Board (NSC 5412, NSC 5412/1 of March 12-15, 1954), the 5412 Group or Special Group (NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955) and the 303 Committee (NSAM 303 of June 2, 1964).<sup>65</sup> In 1959 the Special Group became responsible for the approval of the sensitive air and naval reconnaissance missions conducted on the Soviet periphery.<sup>66</sup>

With the signing of National Security Decision Memorandum 40, "Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision and Coordination of Covert Action Operations," on February 17, 1970, it was required that "the Director of Central

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ly.<sup>61</sup> Among the regu-

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<sup>62</sup> Similarly, the DIA  
it categories in thirty-

Intelligence shall obtain policy approval for all major and/or politically sensitive covert action operations through the 40 Committee."<sup>67</sup> The memorandum also called for an annual review of all covert action programs previously approved.<sup>68</sup>

In addition to the 40 Committee, the Nixon administration created a second committee for the supervision of intelligence activities in general known as the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC). Creation of the NSCIC acknowledged that there were several issues in addition to covert operations and sensitive reconnaissance missions that required high-level attention. These issues included the need to make the intelligence community more responsive to policymakers, the establishment of intelligence priorities, and the allocation of resources.<sup>69</sup> Given the expense of technical collection systems and the competing claims for their time, a higher degree of coordination was required.

The basic two-committee system was continued by the Ford administration and, as already noted, the Carter administration. In Executive Order 11905 President Ford established the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) and the Operations Advisory Group (OAG). The CFI was chaired by the DCI with the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as members. The CFI was given control over budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and was charged with establishing (1) policy priorities for collection and production of national intelligence and (2) policy for the management of the NFIP.<sup>70</sup> Supervision of covert operations was the function of the Operations Advisory Group, which consisted of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the DCI, the Chairman being determined by the President.<sup>71</sup> Membership of the OAG represented an upgrading in the status of the covert operations supervision mechanism. Previously, membership on such committees involved officials at the Under Secretary and Deputy Secretary level.

This upgrading was maintained in the Carter Executive Order 12036 and extended to both committees. The SCC consisted of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as Chairman, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the Chairman of the JCS, the Attorney General, and the Director of the OMB. The PRC-I consisted of the same group except that the Vice President and Secretary of the Treasury were members instead of the Attorney General and Director of the OMB.<sup>72</sup>

Under the Reagan administration the Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence (SIG-I) is given the responsibility to advise and assist the NSC with respect to intelligence policy and intelligence matters. The SIG-I is chaired by the DCI, and its members include the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS.



In addition to the statutory members, provision is made for attendance by departments and agencies with a direct interest in the activities under consideration, including cases involving sensitive intelligence collection activities. The functions of SIG-I require it to:

1. establish requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence;
2. review such National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget proposals and other matters as are referred to it by the Director of Central Intelligence;
3. review proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations referred by the Director of Central Intelligence;
4. develop standards and doctrine for the counterintelligence activities of the United States; resolve interagency differences concerning the implementation of counterintelligence policy; and develop and monitor guidelines, consistent with applicable law and Executive Orders, for the maintenance of central counterintelligence records;
5. consider and approve any counterintelligence activity referred to the Group by the head of any organization in the intelligence community;
6. submit to the NSC an overall annual assessment of the relative threat to United States interests from intelligence and security services of foreign powers and from international terrorist activities; including an assessment of the effectiveness of United States counterintelligence activities;
7. conduct an annual review of ongoing sensitive national foreign intelligence collection operations and sensitive counterintelligence activities and report thereon to the NSC; and
8. carry out such additional coordination review and approval of intelligence activities as the President may direct.<sup>73</sup>

Subordinate to SIG-I are several Interagency Groups, including the Interagency Group for Counterintelligence (IG-CI) and the Interagency Group for Countermeasures (IG-CM). The IG-CI is chaired by the Director of the FBI and includes representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, DCI, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman of the JCS, and the NSA as well as representatives of any other intelligence community organization directly involved in the activities to be discussed. The IG-CI is responsible for developing policy and recommendations for counterintelligence and counter-hostile covert action activities.<sup>74</sup>

The IG-CM is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and is responsible for the development of countermeasures policy for dealing with technical intelligence threats as well for developing policy concerning protective security programs.<sup>75</sup> Subsequent to the initial establishment of NSC SIGs an SIG-Space was established.<sup>76</sup> As with PRC-Space, this committee might have some role in approval of space reconnaissance activities.

The above description applied specifically to the 40 Committee. Subsequently, the Operations Advisory Group and Special Coordination Committee were responsible for approval of sensitive missions. In a break with tradition, the Reagan administration committee with that responsibility, the Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence (SIG-I), is not the committee responsible for supervision of covert action operations.

## MANAGING HUMAN COLLECTION

Managing human source collection involves managing the collection of information from foreign service officers, clandestine agents, and defectors as well as nongovernment individuals. These diverse sources are reflected in the management arrangements for human source collection.

1. to examine problems of human resources in the Central Intelligence Agency;
2. to encourage collaboration between collection agencies and the CIA for the satisfactory resource collection;
3. to assist in the recruitment, collection and retention of personnel.

54-12 Group

# IKE'S SPIES

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Eisenhower  
and the Espionage Establishment

by STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

with RICHARD H. IMMERMANN  
Research Associate

1981

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.

Garden City, New York

CAP, it was his Administration, acting under his orders, that had made liberation "a major goal of American foreign policy." Liberation was good for domestic politics, but a disaster for the Hungarians. They ended up with 30,000 of their best and most courageous young people dead, and a tighter Soviet control than ever before.

SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING came the Suez crisis. Britain and France, acting in conjunction with Israel, invaded Egypt in an attempt to recover control of the Suez Canal from Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser. Ike was angry at the British and French for acting without consulting him, and furious at Allen Dulles for having failed to warn him in advance. He eventually forced the British and French to give the Canal back to Egypt.

Still, Ike was no friend of Nasser's. At one Oval Office conference, he listened to various suggestions on ways the CIA might "topple Nasser." Finally, according to the minutes of the meeting, "The President said that an action of this kind could not be taken when there is as much active hostility as at present. For a thing like this to be done without inflaming the Arab world, a time free from heated stress holding the world's attention as at present would have to be chosen."<sup>14</sup>

In that instance, the President himself said no to the CIA. In other cases, it was the 5412 Committee, chaired by Gordon Gray. Gray had been Truman's Secretary of the Army and then Eisenhower's Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. In 1955 he became Ike's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. He was the liaison between the White House and the State and Defense Departments, as well as Chairman of the 5412 Committee.

That committee (often referred to as the "Special Group") consisted of Gray, the Secretaries of Defense and of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Created in March of 1955 by the National Security Council, in Paper number 5412/1, it was the most secret committee of the U. S. Government. No covert action could be undertaken without the prior approval of the committee.<sup>15</sup> The major function of the special group, according to Gray, was "to protect the President." It would scrutinize proposed CIA actions, policies, and programs to make certain they did not get the President or the country into trouble. The committee dealt with issues too sensitive to be discussed before the whole National Security Council, a large group that debated issues but never set policy.<sup>16</sup>

Richard Bissell explained how the committee worked. "When an operation was about to be undertaken, it would be written up within the clandestine service, and approved up the line, up to and including Allen, and then Allen himself almost always attended the 5412 and then he would present it." At that point the State Department, usually represented by Robert Murphy, Foster Dulles' deputy, would give its approval. When Bissell was asked if an operation, once approved by 5412, would go before the National Security Council, he replied, "No. These were much too sensitive. Remember that under Eisenhower the NSC was a whole big roomful of people."

Gordon Gray would bring the 5412 decision privately and informally to the President. Then, a day or two later, Gray would get back to Allen Dulles and say, "Look, my boss has this or that reaction to this operation." Only then would the CIA spring into action.<sup>17</sup>

During the early years of 5412, the CIA had tremendous confidence in itself, and Ike had tremendous confidence in it. It seemed that the agency could manipulate events anywhere in the world to suit the United States. Iran and Guatemala were the proof.

But Iran and Guatemala, if realistically assessed, would have indicated the unwelcome truth that there were limits on what the United States and the CIA could accomplish. Instead, as Ray Cline noted, "romantic gossip about the coup in Iran spread around Washington like wildfire. Allen Dulles basked in the glory of the exploit without ever confirming or denying the extravagant impression of CIA's power that it created."

The trouble was, as Kim Roosevelt was the first to admit, "the CIA did not have to do very much to topple Mossadegh, who was an eccentric and weak political figure." Iran did not prove that the CIA could overthrow governments when and where it wished; rather "it was a unique case of supplying just the right bit of marginal assistance in the right way at the right time."<sup>18</sup>

In Guatemala "the legend of CIA's invincibility was confirmed in the minds of many by a covert action project that inched one step further toward paramilitary intervention." Again, however, as Cline insists, Guatemala was a unique situation. It required little use of actual force and succeeded mainly because of a shrewd ex-

the meeting simply moved on. I remember my sense of that moment quite clearly because the President's statement came as a great shock to me."<sup>8</sup>

At an August 25, 1960, meeting of the 5412 Committee, covert operations against Lumumba were discussed. Gordon Gray, after hearing about attempts to arrange a vote of no confidence against Lumumba in the Congolese Senate, commented that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation."

Gray later admitted that his reference to his "associates" was a euphemism for Ike, employed to preserve "plausible deniability" by the President.

Dulles replied to Gray's comment by saying "he had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability."

The minutes of the 5412 meeting concluded, "It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."<sup>9</sup>

One of the major functions of 5412, Gordon Gray declared in a 1979 interview, was to "protect the President." In one sense, this meant its task was to carefully scrutinize policies and programs to make sure they did not get the President into trouble. The 5412 Committee also provided a forum for the discussion of operations too sensitive to be discussed before the whole NSC.<sup>10</sup> The committee also provided a perfect device for obscuring the record, making it impossible for the historian to say that this man ordered that action, or otherwise fix responsibility.

The CIA's record, and Ike's, with regard to assassination, is therefore purposely ambiguous. This is true not only with regard to Lumumba but also in the cases of Chou En-lai and Fidel Castro. A review of the whole delicate subject of assassinations and the CIA is thus in order before any conclusions can be attempted.

HOWARD HUNT IS THE SOURCE for the charge that the CIA, in the mid-fifties, had an assassination unit. Hunt said that the unit,

which "was set up to arrange for the assassination of suspected double agents and similar low-ranking officials," was under the command of Colonel Boris T. Pash, a U. S. Army officer assigned to the CIA.<sup>11</sup> Pash's title was Chief of Program Branch 7 (PB/7), a "special operations" unit within the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the original clandestine services organization that eventually became the Directorate of Plans.

Frank Wisner, director of OPC and thus supervisor of Program Branch 7, said that Pash's PB/7 functions included assassinations and "kidnapping of personages behind the Iron Curtain . . . if they were not in sympathy with the regime, and could be spirited out of the country by our people for their own safety; or kidnapping of people whose interests were inimical to ours." This was, Wisner explained in a memorandum, "a matter of keeping up with the Joneses. Every other power practiced assassination if need be." The written charter of the unit read, "PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnapping, and such other functions as from time to time may be given it by higher authority."

Hunt told the Church Committee that at one point in 1953 he had a meeting with Pash and his deputy to discuss "wet affairs," i.e., liquidations, with regard to a double-agent who had penetrated the CIA's operation in West Berlin. Hunt said that Pash "seemed a little startled at the subject. He indicated that it was something that would have to be approved by higher authority and I withdrew and never approached Colonel Pash again."<sup>12</sup>

One attempt was almost made, in 1955, but PB/7 was not involved, the target was not a low-ranking double-agent, and Ike knew nothing about it. A station chief in East Asia sent a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a proposed media propaganda campaign. To it he added a plan to assassinate Communist China's number two man, Chou En-lai. Chou was attending a conference of Third World countries at Bandung. The plan was to have an indigenous agent place an undetectable poison in Chou's rice bowl at the Bandung Conference's final banquet. Chou would die two days later, after his return to Peking.<sup>13</sup>

Allen Dulles vetoed the plan. He had CIA headquarters send out a cable that "strongly censured" the station chief for even suggesting assassination and indicating "in the strongest possible language this Agency has never and never will engage in such activities."

The cable added orders to "immediately proceed to burn all copies" of any documents relating to the plan.<sup>14</sup>

FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, the CIA stayed away from any discussion of political assassination. The subject came up again in 1960. Patrice Lumumba was the target. A brief history of developments in the Congo during the fifties is necessary to an understanding of the Lumumba assassination attempts.

The Belgian Congo, a European colony located in central Africa, was governed by the Belgians as if it were the eighteenth century. There was no local government of any kind; not even the 100,000 Belgians employed in the Congo had any political rights. All power resided with the Governor General, who was appointed by the Belgian Government and derived his powers from it. The Belgians made no attempt to prepare the Congo for independence until 1956, when at the urging of the United Nations some local elections were held to choose African advisers to the municipal governments. These elections led to the formation of political parties in the Congo. Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the Bakongo tribe in Léopoldville, formed one party drawn mostly from his tribe. Patrice Lumumba, a post-office clerk, founded another, which, unlike Kasavubu's, tried to attract supporters on a nationwide basis. Moïse Tshombe formed a third party in the mineral-rich province of Katanga.

The coming of political parties naturally increased the pressure for independence, as no politician could hope to win votes unless he attacked the Belgians and demanded immediate independence. By the beginning of 1960 the Belgians had come to the conclusion that there was only one way they could keep the goodwill of the Congolese after independence, and thus keep possession of the mines, and that was to grant independence as early as possible and trust that the Congolese would recognize that their total inexperience made it necessary for them to rely on Belgian advisers and managers. Elections were quickly arranged, with independence promised for June 30, 1960. The elections would choose a National Assembly, which would then select a head of state and a prime minister.

Kasavubu and Tshombe urged the Belgians to create a federal state, which was natural as they had mainly local support. Lumumba demanded that the existing unitary state, with a strong cen-

tral government, be continued. He argued that it was the only way to keep such a huge and disparate country together. The Belgians supported Lumumba, whose party won the most seats in the National Assembly in the ensuing election, although not enough to enable him to form a government. The Belgian Governor General gave both Lumumba and Kasavubu an opportunity to form a government. When both failed, a deal was made whereby Kasavubu became President, while Lumumba became Prime Minister.<sup>15</sup>

In early July, the army—called the Force Publique—mutinied against its Belgian officers. Kasavubu and Lumumba attempted to reason with the soldiers, but abandoned the effort when Belgian paratroopers entered the country for the purpose of protecting Belgian nationals. Lumumba charged that Belgium was preparing to restore colonial rule. On July 11 he appealed to the United Nations for help. That same day Tshombe, premier of Katanga Province, declared the independence of that province from the Congo, with himself as President. Meanwhile the Force Publique, under the nominal command of its sergeants, had been rapidly disintegrating, committing numerous atrocities against both black and white.

Katanga, the richest part of the Congo and thus the area of most concern to the Belgians, settled down under Tshombe's rule. He was discreetly backed by the Belgian mining companies, who paid their taxes to him and not to the central government. The United Nations, meanwhile, responding to Lumumba's plea for help, sent a peace-keeping force to the Congo.

In late July, Lumumba flew to the United States to consult with UN and State Department officials. He made a very bad impression on Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. "He would never look you in the eye," Dillon reported. "He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't have any relation to the particular things that we wanted to discuss. You had a feeling that he was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only characterize as messianic. . . . He was just not a rational being."

The State Department had hoped that it would be able to work with Lumumba, but those hopes vanished after his meeting with Dillon, who concluded that "this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with."<sup>16</sup>

Rebuffed, Lumumba returned to the Congo. Unable to obtain



arms and support in the United States, he turned to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev had already been shaking his fist at the West in general and the Belgians in particular, warning them not to attempt to reassert colonial control in the Congo. The Russian leader responded positively to Lumumba's request for military planes.

On August 18, 1960, Dillon reported on developments in the Congo to a meeting of the NSC, at which Ike was present. Both Lumumba and Khrushchev were demanding that the UN peace-keeping force get out of the Congo. Dillon, according to the minutes, said that "the elimination of the U.N. would be a disaster which . . . we should do everything we could to prevent." If the UN were forced out, he warned, the Soviets would come in. The minutes went on, "Secretary Dillon said that Lumumba was working to serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay."<sup>17</sup>

Ike then said it was "simply inconceivable" that the United States could allow the UN to be forced out of the Congo. "We should keep the U.N. in the Congo," the President said, "even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight." Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Ambassador to the UN, said he doubted that the UN force could stay in the Congo if the government of the Congo was determined to kick it out. The President responded, the minutes record, by stating "that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent—we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets." The Congolese people wanted the UN force there, Ike declared.<sup>18</sup>

THE FIRST DIRECT REFERENCE to assassination as a solution came from Hedgman, the station chief in Léopoldville who had sent the alarmist telegram of August 18. On August 24 he reported that anti-Lumumba leaders in the Congo had approached Kasavubu with a plan to assassinate Lumumba, but Kasavubu had refused to endorse it because he was reluctant to resort to violence and in any case there was no other leader of sufficient stature to replace Lumumba.<sup>19</sup>

The next day, August 25, the 5412 Committee met to discuss CIA plans for political actions against Lumumba. It was at this meeting that Gordon Gray, Ike's personal representative on 5412, reported that the President "had expressed extremely strong feel-

ings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this." The minutes state that the committee "finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."<sup>20</sup>

The following morning, Allen Dulles sent his own cable to Hedgman in Léopoldville telling him that the "removal" of Lumumba was an "urgent" objective.

Before Hedgman could act, the swirling events inside the Congo intervened. On September 5, President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba from the government. He evidently was afraid that Lumumba would make the Congo into a Cold War battleground. Lumumba's dismissal should have solved the problem, but Hedgman wired Dulles, "LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE."

In response, Dulles told Hedgman that the United States was apprehensive about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the Congo by virtue of his personality, irrespective of his official position. A week later, on September 14, General Joseph Mobutu seized power via a military coup. Lumumba then placed himself in UN custody.

Hedgman thought that by turning to the UN peace-keeping force for protection, Lumumba had strengthened his position (at least he was temporarily safe from Hedgman and the CIA). Hedgman wired Dulles, "ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM [Lumumba] FROM SCENE SOONEST."<sup>21</sup>

At this stage Richard Bissell asked a CIA scientist, Joseph Scheider, to make preparations to assassinate or incapacitate an unspecified "African leader." Bissell told Scheider that the assignment had the "highest authority" behind it. Scheider procured toxic biological materials and reported that he was ready.<sup>22</sup>

On September 19, 1960, Bissell cabled Hedgman, telling him to expect a messenger from Washington in the near future. Two days later, at an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of." On September 26, Scheider flew to Léopoldville with the lethal substances, which he gave to Hedgman. Scheider told Hedgman that President Eisenhower personally had ordered the assassination of Lumumba.<sup>23</sup>

The substance was never used. Lumumba remained under UN protection until November 27, when he decided to go to Stanleyville to engage in political activity. Hedgeman found out about Lumumba's plans and reported them to Mobutu. In addition, he cooperated with Mobutu in setting up roadblocks to help capture Lumumba.

A few days later, Lumumba was captured. Mobutu held him in prison until January 17, 1961, just three days before Ike left office, when he put Lumumba aboard an airplane that took him to Elisabethville in Katanga Province. So many of Lumumba's followers had been butchered at the Elisabethville airport that the place was known as the "slaughterhouse."

At the slaughterhouse, Lumumba was murdered. Eyewitnesses to his appearance as he was dragged off the plane testified later that he might well not have survived the beatings to which he had already been subjected anyway.<sup>24</sup>

So, in the end, the CIA was not directly involved in Lumumba's murder, although it had been in on his capture. That begs the question as to whether Ike ordered the man killed, however, or if Allen Dulles took it upon himself to put out the contract. It is simply one man's word against another's. John Eisenhower pointed out to the Church Committee that assassination was contrary to his father's philosophy that "no man is indispensable," and as noted Andrew Goodpaster was unequivocal in denying that Ike ever gave any order to assassinate anyone, and positive in his belief that he would have known about it had such orders been given.

Gordon Gray, who was present at all the crucial meetings, testified that "I agree that assassination could have been on the minds of some people when they used these words 'eliminate' or 'get rid of.' I am just trying to say it was not seriously considered as a program of action by the President or even the 5412 Committee." Gray also said that "there may well have been in the CIA plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but at the level of 5412 or a higher level than that, the NSC, there was no active discussion in any way planning assassinations."<sup>25</sup>

But to Richard Bissell, who was after all the number two man in the CIA, Dulles' cable to Léopoldville was a clear signal that the President had authorized the CIA to kill Lumumba. At the Church Committee, this exchange occurred:

"Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?"

Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.

Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously through this kind of cable?"

Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect."

Bissell went on to say, "I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant."<sup>26</sup>

FIDEL CASTRO WAS THE NEXT CIA TARGET and the object of numerous assassination attempts. Some of the operations against Fidel crossed the border into pure lunacy. A part of the explanation as to how things got so completely out of hand is that the CIA was, by the end of the Eisenhower administration, at the peak of its power, prestige, influence, and cockiness. Another part is that having a Communist regime so close to the States, literally thumbing its nose at Uncle Sam, and this on an island that owed its independence to the United States and that had always had a special relationship with Washington, infuriated American policy-makers. Quite simply, it drove them mad. The result was lunatic actions.

Item: The CIA's Office of Medical Services treated a box of Fidel's favorite cigars with a botulinus toxin so potent that Castro would die the instant he put one in his mouth. The cigars were given to an agent who claimed he could get them into Cuba and into Fidel's hands.<sup>27</sup>

Item: Richard Bissell enlisted the Mafia in a plot to kill Castro. Bissell liked the idea of bringing the Mafia in on it because the gangsters would be highly motivated, having been cut out of their very lucrative gambling operation in Havana. Thus they had "their own reasons for hostility." Further, the Mafia provided "the ultimate cover" because "there was very little chance that anything the syndicate would try to do would be traced back to the CIA." Bissell thought the Mafia was extremely efficient and it had an unquestioned record of successful "hits."

Contacts were made with Johnny Rosselli, who had learned his trade under Al Capone, and Salvatore Giancana (also known as "Sam Gold"), who was on the FBI's list of ten-most-wanted crim-



nals. The CIA wanted a "gangland-style killing" in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana opposed the idea because it would be difficult to recruit a hit man for such a dangerous operation, and Rosselli said he wanted something "nice and clean, without getting into any kind of out-and-out ambushing." Giancana suggested a poison that would disappear without a trace. The CIA then prepared a botulinus toxin pill that "did the job expected of it" when tested on monkeys. Pills were given to a Cuban for delivery to the island. Obviously, none were ever dropped into Fidel's coffee.<sup>28</sup>

The various CIA plots to destroy Castro's public image were even more ridiculous. One scheme was to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a chemical similar to LSD, thus undermining his charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. That idea was discarded because the chemical was unreliable. Next the Technical Services Division of the CIA impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical that produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Fidel to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a major speech.

Another plan involved a trip out of Cuba that Castro was scheduled to take. The Technical Services Division prepared some thallium salts that could be dusted onto Castro's shoes when he left them outside his hotel room to be shined. The salts were a strong depilant that would cause Fidel's beard to fall out, thus destroying his *machismo* image.<sup>29</sup>

HOW MUCH IKE KNEW about this nonsense is unclear. Dulles was certainly informed. In December 1959, J. C. King, the former FBI agent who was head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, sent a memorandum to Dulles recommending that "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro." King said that neither Raúl Castro nor Che Guevara had "the same mesmeric appeal to the masses" and that Fidel's elimination "would greatly accelerate the fall of the present Government." Dulles gave the recommendation his approval.<sup>30</sup>

Whether Dulles told Ike or not is the point at issue. Richard Bissell testified before the Church Committee that he did not inform either the 5412 Committee or President Eisenhower of the Castro assassination operation. Bissell added that to his knowledge, neither did Dulles tell Ike. However, Bissell said he believed that Dulles would have advised the President (but not the 5412 people

or the NSC) in a "circumlocutions" or "oblique" way. Bissell admitted that his observation was "pure personal opinion" based on his understanding of Dulles' standard operation procedure in sensitive covert operations. But Bissell also said that Dulles never told him that he had so advised Eisenhower, although he ordinarily did let Bissell know when he had used the "circumlocutions" approach with the President.<sup>31</sup>

Other testimony before the Church Committee strongly denied that the President had any knowledge of a CIA connection with the Mafia or any assassination plots against Castro. Gordon Gray said that he had direct orders from the President to the effect that "all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty of other countries must be deliberated by the Special Group (the 5412 Committee)." Like Bissell, Gray said that the 5412 people never discussed any assassination plans for Castro. "I find it very difficult to believe," Gray testified, "and I do not believe, that Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to President Eisenhower with such a proposition without my knowing about it from Mr. Dulles."<sup>32</sup>

As to the possibility that Ike and Dulles conferred privately about the plot, General Goodpaster—who ordinarily was the first person to see the President in the morning—testified, "That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He had made it very clear to us how he wanted to handle matters of this kind, and we had set up procedures to see that they were then handled that way." SOP was to clear everything with 5412, then get the President's direct approval, as in the U-2 program. Bissell's assumption of a "circumlocutions" personal conversation between Ike and Dulles was to Goodpaster "completely unlikely."<sup>33</sup>

Thomas Parrott, Secretary for the 5412 Committee, said, "I just cannot conceive that President Eisenhower would have gone off and mounted some kind of covert operation on his own. This certainly would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's staff method of doing business."<sup>34</sup>

John Eisenhower, who was Goodpaster's assistant, testified that his father had confided secret matters to him "to a very large extent." As examples, John said Ike had told him about the atomic bomb a month before Hiroshima. He then said that his father "never told him of any CIA activity involving an assassination plan or attempt concerning Castro and it was his opinion that President Eisenhower would have told him if the President had known about

# WILDERNESS OF THINGS MIRRORS

How the Byzantine intrigues  
of the secret war between the CIA  
and the KGB seduced and devoured  
key agents James Jesus Angleton  
and William King Harvey

DAVID C. MARTIN

Portions of this work originally appeared in *Playboy*.

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FIRST EDITION

*Designer: Sidney Feinberg*

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data,

Martin, David C.

Wilderness of mirrors.

Includes index.

1. United States. Central Intelligence Agency.
2. Intelligence service—United States.
3. United States—Foreign relations—Russia.
4. Russia—Foreign relations—United States.

I. Title.

HV7961.M37 327'.12'0973 79-2629

ISBN 0-06-013037-7

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80 81 82 83 84 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

management aided and abetted by economic warfare waged overtly with a trade embargo and covertly with sabotage. The program would require a government-wide effort, for which the President's brother "would be the most effective commander," Goodwin wrote.

Instead, Kennedy chose Brigadier General Edward Lansdale as his Cuba commander. Lansdale was a romantic figure of considerable proportions—the stuff of which two novels, Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* and William Lederer's *The Ugly American*, were made. Nominally an Air Force officer, Lansdale had been a CIA operative waging unconventional war against Communist insurgents in the Philippines and Vietnam. He had returned to Washington the week before Kennedy's inauguration to write a gloomy twelve-page memo on "the downhill and dangerous trend in Vietnam." New departures were needed, Lansdale wrote, and they were needed at once. "The U.S. should recognize that Vietnam is in critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the Cold War, as an area requiring emergency treatment." The memo so struck the President's fancy that he wanted to name Lansdale as his ambassador to Saigon, an appointment that Secretary of State Dean Rusk managed to block by threatening to resign. Now Kennedy needed to administer "emergency treatment" to another "combat area of the Cold War," and Lansdale was his man.

On November 30, 1961, the President secretly directed his cabinet to "use our available assets . . . to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime." Lansdale was placed in command, and a special panel chaired by the President's military representative, General Maxwell Taylor, was created to oversee the operation. The roster of the Special Group—national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, CIA Director John McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer, Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, and Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson—clearly signaled that this was not just another box on the organization chart. The panel was augmented by the addition of one other member, the President's brother. Bobby Kennedy would give the panel both its official title—Special Group (Augmented)—and its sense of urgency.

In an effort to give the new Cuba operation an extra measure of protection from public disclosure, it was assigned a deliberately

a two-mile radius. That meant the helicopter would have to search more than twelve square miles of jungle for a transmitter the size of a suitcase.

"He used to drive everybody crazy with his ideas," an aide to Helms said. "He'd bombard Harvey with a million goddamn papers all the time." Task 33 was typical Lansdale, a member of Task Force W recalled. The CIA didn't have a single agent in place who could perform the task by covert means, and any overt effort, such as spraying the sugar workers from the air like so many insects, would be traced immediately to the United States. "Reaction to such an attack would probably result in demonstrations and riots . . . throughout the world," a memo from the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted. Another invasion of Cuba "could conceivably cause less furor in the international forum and perhaps be less detrimental to the long-term interests of the United States" than Lansdale's Task 33.

Lansdale's brainstorm spawned ever more fanciful schemes as CIA planners racked their brains for ways to implement his grandiose ideas. Operation BOUNTY called for a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists." Leaflets would be dropped over Cuba listing rewards ranging from \$5,000 for an "informant" to \$10,000 for "government officials." Castro would be worth only "2¢." Another plan, dubbed "Elimination by Illumination," called for nothing less than a reenactment of the Second Coming. According to Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer who served as secretary to the Special Group (Augmented), "This plan consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro [who] was anti-Christ. And you would spread this word around Cuba and then . . . just over the horizon there would be an American submarine which would surface off of Cuba and send up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of the Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown."

Undaunted, Lansdale turned out a "Basic Action Plan" for MONGOOSE designed to culminate in the "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime"—"the touchdown play," as he liked

to call it—by the end of October of 1962. The timetable was preposterous, especially coming from a man who lectured others on how long it had taken the Communists to build an insurgency in Vietnam. Members of Harvey's Task Force W decided that Lansdale's October deadline had more to do with the November elections than with the realities of insurgency. Even the Special Group (Augmented) found Lansdale's "Basic Action Plan" excessive and issued guidelines stating that simple intelligence collection would be the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts in the coming months." Covert actions should be kept on a scale "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt." Since there was virtually no chance that any covert action could inspire a revolt against Castro, the guidelines countenanced almost any havoc the CIA could wreak.

A total of four hundred CIA officers were assigned to Task Force W. Foreign diplomats and businessmen traveling to Cuba were recruited as spies; Cuban officials traveling abroad were pressured to defect; and political-action programs were mounted to provoke other nations into severing diplomatic ties with Cuba. One member of Task Force W went around the world attempting to persuade firms whose products reached Cuba despite the trade embargo to sabotage their wares. Two other officers, outfitted with phony Italian names, roamed the United States in search of members of the Mafia who had had gambling interests in Cuba in the days before Castro. "Task Force W was all out of proportion," one member said. "We had a force working on Cuba that was the equivalent for an entire area of the world. I specifically was told that I could have as many people as I wanted when I got my job."

JM/WAVE, the CIA's forward operations base in Florida, was revitalized under the command of Ted Shackley, a thirty-four-year-old protégé of Harvey's from Berlin. Unlike CIA stations overseas, JM/WAVE did not have the benefit of an American embassy to provide diplomatic cover for its operations, so it had to be run under commercial cover. The sign over the entrance to the weather-beaten clapboard building located in an abandoned corner of the University of Miami's campus read "Zenith Technical Enterprises Inc." Inside, the walls were cluttered with sales charts, business licenses, even an award certificate from the United Givers' Fund



citing Zenith for its contributions to the annual fund-raising drive. JM/WAVE soon became the largest CIA station in the world. "You can't imagine how many people were involved," an aide to Helms said. Operations included the overt interrogation of the three thousand refugees who arrived each week from Havana; the thinly veiled activities of the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation, which broadcast propaganda and coded messages over Radio Swan; and the secret training of commandos for missions into Cuba. Bases were scattered throughout the Everglades and Florida Keys; high-speed boats disguised as pleasure craft were moored at marinas up and down the peninsula, and safe houses were located in some of the poshest neighborhoods of Key Biscayne and Coral Gables. Scores of proprietary firms with such names as Paragon Air Service provided logistical support for the vast complex, while literally thousands of Cuban exiles worked for JM/WAVE as drivers, cooks, informants, boat captains, commandos, and case officers. It was impossible to tell where JM/WAVE left off and the myriad anti-Castro groups operating out of Miami began. If JM/WAVE did not actually direct their activities, its money made them possible. "As you look back upon the goddamn thing, so much of the goddamn stuff was really juvenile," an aide to Helms said. "And what it cost."

"We were running a ferry service back and forth to the island with agents," a member of Task Force W recalled. Teams of Cuban exiles were dispatched in the dark of the moon, setting out in 150-foot-long "mother ships" for the 90-mile run to Cuba. While still in international waters, the teams transferred to 20-foot fiberglass boats powered by twin 100-horsepower engines for the high-speed run to the beach, covering the last stretch of water in a rubber dinghy outfitted with a heavily muffled 25-horsepower motor. Once ashore, the teams sank the dinghies among the mangroves or deflated and buried them in the sand. Some of the teams simply left weapons caches for agents already on the island. Others headed inland toward their native provinces, where they could seek out relatives who might give them food and shelter while they went about the tedious task of building an underground network. The exiles sent out radio reports on the condition of the transportation and food-distribution systems, the status of power and water supplies, the schedules of

police patrols, and all the other measures of Castro's grip on the island. They distributed leaflets informing the populace that the worm—or *gusano*, as Castro called the exile community—had turned. They urged their compatriots to commit minor sabotage such as leaving the lights on and the water running. They carried condoms filled with graphite to dump into an engine's oil system.

But minor sabotage "didn't appeal to the Cubans," Maxwell Taylor said. "They wanted to go in there and throw a bomb at somebody." The official records of Operation MONGOOSE contained only the slightest hint of the ferocity with which this secret war was waged. The code names the CIA assigned to some of its agents inside Cuba—names like BLOOD, WHIP, and LASH—were more expressive of the mayhem involved. "This demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation," Lansdale said. "Cut off their heads and leave them in the trails," an aide to Lansdale chanted.

Sabotage missions were launched against bridges, power transformers, microwave towers, tank farms, and railroad lines within reach of the beach. The commandos set their mortars in the sand, lobbed a few shells inland, and retreated to sea. "Sometimes mortar rounds go long and they land in a village," the chief of Task Force W's paramilitary operations said philosophically. "People died," Harvey's executive assistant said, "no question of that." All to no avail. "To the best of my knowledge, there wasn't one damn thing that was accomplished of any note at all," the paramilitary chief said. "Absolute failure."

The rationale behind the sabotage was that it would result in economic dislocations that would sow discontent among the people and provide fertile ground for nurturing a resistance network. But the Special Group (Augmented) repeatedly balked at approving the kind of assault that would work any real economic hardship. As Tom Parrott, the secretary to the Special Group, explained, "Nobody knew exactly what they wanted to do. It had only been a year since the Bay of Pigs and nobody wanted to get into another one of those. What was our policy toward Cuba? Well, our policy toward Cuba was to keep the pot simmering." Over and over the phrase was used. "Keep the pot simmering." After a while, Harvey's

paramilitary aide said, "it began to dawn on us that we were involved in a random event."

"What's the matter with these bastards?" Harvey grouched to Parrott. "Why don't they get off their duffs and do something?" The matter was that the Special Group didn't trust Harvey. "Your friend Harvey doesn't inspire much confidence," Bundy snapped at Parrott. Harvey was terribly long-winded. He would drone on and on in his low-pitched monotone, oblivious to the fact that the Attorney General, whose own clipped phrases were the epitome of terseness, was drumming his fingers on the table. "Tell him not to mumble so much," one member of the Special Group said to Parrott. For all his mumbling, Harvey was not telling the Special Group what it wanted to know. "Bill had trouble getting down to the specifics some of the military people were demanding," Parrott said. "They would want to know exactly 'What are these guys going to do—what night are they going, what time, what are they going to hit, what's their disaster plan?'" Harvey preferred to talk concepts. "Look, Mr. Harvey," Maxwell Taylor interrupted, "we've got to have more specifics."

Everything had to be laid before the Special Group in "excruciating detail," Harvey griped. "It went down to such things as the gradients on the beach and the composition of the sand," Harvey's executive assistant said. The Special Group even wanted to know what rations the raiders would carry. "It was almost as if Bill and the rest of us were accused of trying to sucker them into another Bay of Pigs," Harvey's paramilitary aide said. "It was an insult to our professionalism," the executive assistant added, "and it was a useless exercise. What difference did it make if they were carrying a .38 or a .45?" Exasperated, Harvey complained to McCone. "To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying," he wrote in his typically long-winded fashion. "You could see trouble coming," Helms's assistant said.

Bobby Kennedy browbeat Harvey and his aides so relentlessly that after one session Taylor turned to him and said, "You could

sack a town and enjoy it." The Attorney General would call a junior officer in the Task Force W bunker at Langley, bark out an order, and hang up, leaving the CIA man wondering whether he had just talked to the President's brother or a prankster. He gave one officer the name of "a man who was in contact with a small group of Cubans who had a plan for creating an insurrection." When the officer reported back that the Cubans did not seem to have a concrete plan, Kennedy ordered him to fly to Guantánamo and "start working and developing this particular group." The officer protested, saying that the CIA had promised the Defense Department not to work out of Guantánamo. "We will see about that," Kennedy snapped. Sometimes the Attorney General would take things into his own hands, and the CIA would not find out about it until after the fact. He sent Lansdale down to Miami in a futile effort to form a cohesive government-in-exile and kept the trip a secret from the CIA. "I felt you preferred informing the President privately," Lansdale said in a handwritten note to Kennedy. The Attorney General frequently dealt directly with some of the Cuban exiles who were supposed to be Harvey's agents. They would troop in and out of the Justice Department bearing firsthand reports of CIA ineptitudes. "One of these Cubans told him we were asking the refugees questions about what they thought of President Kennedy," Helms's aide said. "RFK raised a stink that this was getting JFK too closely involved."

It was vintage Bobby Kennedy, turning the bureaucracy upside down and shaking it by the heels. Such tactics served him well in most endeavors, but not when it came to the business of spying, with all its reverence for "tradecraft." Even the unorthodox Lansdale was taken aback by Kennedy's antibureaucratic instincts. Lansdale had taken some top-secret documents to Hickory Hill, where Kennedy lay sick in bed with the flu. Kennedy spread the papers over the covers, and the two men discussed the latest plans for Castro's overthrow while children played with a train set under the bed. "We were discussing these very sensitive matters," Lansdale recalled, shaking his head, "and this kid was going 'Choo-choo' around my feet."

To Harvey, it was all so much amateurish meddling. Soon he

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#### PRINTING HISTORY

Random edition published June 1964  
2nd printing ..... June 1964  
3rd printing ..... June 1964  
4th printing ..... August 1964  
5th printing .... September 1964

Kiplinger Book Service edition published July 1964

Serialized, in condensed form, by ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, BOSTON GLOBE, and CHICAGO SUN-TIMES July-August 1964.

Book First Club edition published August 1964

Book-of-the-Month Club edition published February 1965

Bantam edition published March 1965

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Published simultaneously in the United States and Canada.

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ranking military men in the summer of 1963 McCone offered a figure of \$2,000,000,000 \* and estimated that 100,000 persons were involved in intelligence work.

However, McCone appeared to be limiting his estimate to the money spent by the CIA and the other agencies on the more conventional forms of intelligence work. In addition, \$2,000,000,000 is spent each year on electronic intelligence (the NSA and aerial spying). When the two forms of intelligence are included, the total budget reaches \$4,000,000,000 and the personnel figure amounts to about 200,000.

It is often assumed that the National Security Council controls this vast intelligence establishment. But in practice much of the activity of the Invisible Government is never examined at NSC meetings. Nor is it disclosed to the United States Intelligence Board (which, for example, was not informed in advance of the Bay of Pigs).

The important decisions about the Invisible Government are made by the committee known as the Special Group. Although the composition of the committee has varied slightly, its membership has generally included the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (or his deputy), and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the Kennedy and early Johnson Administrations, the presidential representative—and key man—on the Special Group was McGeorge Bundy. The others members were McCone, McNamara, Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

The Special Group was created early in the Eisenhower years under the secret Order 54/12. It was known in the innermost circle of the Eisenhower Administration as the "54/12 Group" and is still so called by a few insiders. The Special Group grew out of the "OCB luncheon

\* Significantly, many CIA officials estimate that the Soviet Union spends \$2,000,000,000 a year on its spy apparatus. On the other hand, Soviet Secret Police Chief Alexander N. Shchepin estimated in 1959 that the CIA spent \$1,500,000,000 a year and employed 20,000 persons.

group." \* It has operated for a decade as the hidden power center of the Invisible Government. Its existence is virtually unknown outside the intelligence community and, even there, only a handful of men are aware of it.

The Special Group meets about once a week to make the crucial decisions—those which are too sensitive or too divisive to be entrusted to USIB. The more grandiose of the Invisible Government's operations have been launched in this exclusive arena. It is here in this hidden corner of the massive governmental apparatus that the United States is regularly committed to policies which walk the tightrope between peace and war.

CIA men generally have the Special Group in mind when they insist that the agency has never set policy, but has only acted on higher authority.

"The facts are," Allen Dulles has declared, "that the CIA has never carried out any action of a political nature, given any support of any nature to any persons, potentates or movements, political or otherwise, without appropriate approval at a high political level in our government outside the CIA."<sup>1</sup>

To the average citizen, Dulles' statement might logically conjure up a picture of the Cabinet, the National Security Council or some special presidential commission meeting in solemn session to debate the wisdom of a dangerous clandestine operation.

But, in fact, some decisions of this type have been made by the Special Group in an informal way without the elaborate records and procedures of other high government committees. And these fateful decisions have been made without benefit of outside analysis. Little detached criticism has been brought to bear on the natural human tendency of the leaders of the Invisible Government to

\* The OCB, the Operations Coordinating Board, was composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President's Special Assistant (National Security Affairs), and the directors of CIA, USA, and the old International Cooperation Administration. They were supposed to make sure the President's decisions were carried out in their departments. The OCB was abolished by President Kennedy in his first month in office.

embark upon ventures which might prove their toughness, demonstrate their vision or expand their power.

The "euphoria of secrecy goes to the head," as C. P. Snow, the English scientist-novelist, has observed, and the Special Group has operated in an atmosphere of secrecy exceeding that of any other branch of the United States Government.

It is apparent, then, that the two presidential watchdog committees, the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the Eisenhower Administration and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, have had great difficulty getting to the bottom of things. Both committees were composed of part-time consultants who met only occasionally during the year.

The original committee had, in fact, been established by Eisenhower in 1956 at least partly to head off closer scrutiny of the Invisible Government. In 1955 the full Hoover Commission had recommended that such a presidential committee be established. But it had also proposed the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

The Eisenhower Administration compromised. It complied with the first and more innocuous of the recommendations, but opposed the Joint Congressional Committee, which was anathema to the CIA.

The Hoover Commission's Intelligence Task Force, headed by General Mark W. Clark, had submitted a much stronger recommendation. It had proposed a single watchdog commission composed of senators, congressmen, and presidential appointees.

"The Task Force is concerned," its report stated, "over the absence of satisfactory machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is making recommendations which it believes will provide the proper type of 'watchdog' commission as a means of re-establishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so essential to and characteristic of our democratic form of government."

The Task Force was critical in tone: "There is still

much to be done by our intelligence community to bring its achievements up to an acceptable level.

"The glamour and excitement of some angles of our intelligence effort must not be permitted to overshadow other vital phases of the work or to cause neglect of primary functions. A majority of the Task Force is convinced that an internal reorganization of the CIA is necessary to give assurance that each of these functions gets adequate attention without diversionary interest."<sup>2</sup>

Earlier studies of the CIA had been less critical. The 1949 Hoover Task Force, headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a Wall Street broker, found the CIA "sound in principle," although it recommended that "vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal structure . . . and the quality of its product."<sup>3</sup>

In 1954 a special presidential study group, led by General James H. Doolittle, said the CIA was doing a "credit-able job." But it detected "important areas in which the CIA organization, administration and operations can and should be improved."<sup>4</sup>

In between, Allen Dulles surveyed the CIA for President Truman prior to joining the agency. But his report was kept secret.

By 1954 substantial pressure had built up in Congress for a closer scrutiny of the intelligence community. Mike Mansfield, then a freshman senator from Montana, submitted a resolution that would have carried out the Hoover Commission recommendation by creating a Joint Committee on the Central Intelligence Agency. In its final form, the resolution called for a twelve-man committee, six from the Senate and six from the House, and for the appropriation of \$250,000 for staff expenditures during the first year.

Thirty-four senators joined Mansfield in sponsoring the resolution. But by the time the proposal came to a vote on April 11, 1956, fourteen of these sponsors had reversed themselves, and the resolution was defeated, fifty-nine to twenty-seven. Thirteen of those who had changed their minds were Republicans evidently reflecting White House pressure. Many of the Democrats who voted against the

This problem, as important and complex as it may be, is secondary to the larger question of whether the CIA sets its own policy, outside of presidential control. While this accusation contains some truth, it, too, is oversimplified. There are procedures which call for the approval of any major special operation at a high level in the executive branch of the government. The public comments of Eisenhower on Guatemala and Kennedy on the Bay of Pigs demonstrated that they not only approved these operations, but took part in the planning for them.

However, many important decisions appear to have been delegated to the Special Group, a small and shadowy directorate nowhere specifically provided for by law. But because the Special Group is composed of men with heavy responsibilities in other areas, it obviously can give no more than general approval and guidance to a course of action. The CIA and the other agencies of the Invisible Government are free to shape events in the field. They can influence policy and chart their own course within the flexible framework laid down by Washington.

In Costa Rica, for example, CIA officers did not see fit to inform the State Department when they planted a fake Communist document in a local newspaper. In Cairo, "Mr. X" slipped in to see Nasser ahead of the State Department's special emissary. In the Bay of Pigs planning, the CIA men selected the political leadership of the Cuban exiles.

Yet because of the existence of the Special Group and a generalized mechanism for approving operations, intelligence men have been able to claim that they have never acted outside of policy set at the highest level of the government. In short, even when a clear policy has been established, a President may find it difficult to enforce. Presidential power, despite the popular conception of it, is diffuse and limited. The various departments and agencies under his authority have entrenched sources of strength. They cannot always be molded to his will.

In his relations with the Invisible Government, the President's problems are compounded. He cannot deal with it openly and publicly. He cannot bring to bear

against it the normal political tools at his disposal. He cannot go over the heads of the leaders of the intelligence community and appeal to the people.

A President operates under a constant awareness of the capacity of disgruntled members of the Invisible Government to undercut his purposes by leaking information to Congress and the press. During the deliberations leading to the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy obviously realized the political dangers of canceling a plan to overthrow Castro which had been brought to an advanced stage by a Republican administration. Similarly, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, White House officials suspected that someone high in the CIA was attempting to undermine the President by providing the Republicans with information.

This suspicion reflected the fact that the Invisible Government has achieved a quasi-independent status and a power of its own. Under these conditions, and given the necessity for secret activities to remain secret, can the Invisible Government ever be made fully compatible with the democratic system?

The answer is no. It cannot be made fully compatible. But, on the other hand, it seems inescapable that some form of Invisible Government is essential to national security in a time of Cold War. Therefore, the urgent necessity in such a national dilemma is to make the Invisible Government as reconcilable as possible with the democratic system, aware that no more than a tenuous compromise can be achieved.

What, then, is to be done?

Most important, the public, the President and the Congress must support steps to control the intelligence establishment, to place checks on its power and to make it truly accountable, particularly in the area of special operations.

The danger of special operations does not lie in tables of organization or questions of technique, but in embarking upon them too readily and without effective presidential control. Special operations pose dangers not only to the nations against which they are directed, but to ourselves. They raise the question of how far a free society, in at-

NSC 54/12

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# The CIA

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## and the Cult

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## of Intelligence

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Victor Marchetti

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and John D. Marks

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INTRODUCTION BY MELVIN L. WULF

A DELL BOOK

Published by  
DELL PUBLISHING CO., INC.  
1 Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza  
New York, N.Y. 10017  
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For information contact  
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, N.Y. 10022  
Dell ® TM 681510, Dell Publishing Co., Inc.  
Reprinted by arrangement with  
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.  
Printed in the United States of America  
First Dell printing—January 1975

AND YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH  
AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.  
John, viii: 32  
(inscribed on the marble wall of the  
main lobby at CIA headquarters,  
Langley, Virginia)



that the CIA should not be accountable to Congress; but that, essentially, has been the experience of the past twenty-five years.

### *The 40 Committee*

The executive branch has its own mechanisms to control the CIA. While these procedures are slanted greatly to favor the agency's position, they do require high-level—usually presidential—approval of all major covert operations except the CIA's classical espionage activities.

By the 1947 law, the CIA falls under the National Security Council, reports to the President through it, and takes its orders from it. But the NSC has, in fact, become a moribund body during the Nixon administration, and the agency reports sometimes to the President but more often to the NSC staff headed by Henry Kissinger. By levying intelligence-collection priority requirements and requesting analytical contributions to policy studies, the Kissinger staff plays a large part in directing the CIA's information-gathering effort. As far as the agency is concerned, however, the NSC itself is little more than a conduit from the President and Kissinger to the CIA, a legal fiction which is preserved because the 1947 law gives it authority over the agency.

Every major CIA proposal for covert action—including subsidies for foreign political leaders, political parties, or publications; interference in elections; major propaganda activities; and paramilitary operations—still must be approved by the President or the 40 Committee.\* The nearly ubiquitous Kissinger chairs this committee, just as he heads the three other principal White House panels which supervise the intelligence community.

Allen Dulles described the 40 Committee's role in *The Craft of Intelligence*: "The facts are that the CIA has never carried out any action of a political nature, given any support of any nature to any persons, potentials or movements, political or otherwise, without appropriate approval at a

\* Over the last twenty-five years this body has also been called the Special Group, the 54-12 Group, and the 303 Committee. Its name has changed with new administrations or whenever its existence has become publicly known.

high political level in our government outside the CIA" (Dulles' italics). Dulles' statement was and is correct, but he carefully omitted any mention of the CIA's espionage activities. He also did not mention that the 40 Committee functions in such a way that it rarely turns down CIA requests for covert action.

The committee is supposed to meet once a week, but the busy schedule of its members\* causes relatively frequent cancellations. When it does meet—roughly once or twice a month in the Nixon administration—intentionally incomplete minutes are kept by its one permanent staff member, who is always a CIA officer. All the proposals for American intervention overseas that come before the committee are drafted by the CIA's clandestine services, and thus are likely to maximize the benefits to be gained, by agency action and to minimize the disadvantages and risks. More often than not, these proposals are put into final form only a few days before the 40 Committee meets. Thus, the non-CIA members often have little time to investigate the issues adequately. And even when sufficient prior notice is given, the staff work that can be done is extremely limited by the supersecrecy surrounding the 40 Committee's deliberations and the fact that only a handful of people outside the agency are cleared to know about its activities. Even within the CIA the short deadlines and the excessive secrecy allow for little independent review of the projects by the Director's own staff.

The 40 Committee's members have so many responsibilities in their own departments that they usually have only a general knowledge of most countries of the world. On specific problems, they generally rely on advice from their agency's regional experts, but these officials are often denied access to 40 Committee proposals and never are allowed to accompany their bosses to committee sessions. Only the DCI is permitted to bring with him an area specialist, and the other high officials, deprived of their own spear carriers, sit at a marked disadvantage. Moreover, the 40 Committee members are men who have been admitted into the very

\* In addition to Kissinger, they are currently the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

private and exclusive world of covert operations, and they have an overwhelming tendency to agree with whatever is proposed, once they are let in on the secret. The non-CIA members of the committee have had little or no experience in covert operations, and they tend to defer to the views of the "experts." Columnist Stewart Alsop, himself an OSS veteran, described in the May 25, 1973, *Washington Post* how the brightest men in the Kennedy administration could have approved an adventure with so small a chance of success as the Bay of Pigs invasion, and his explanation applies just as well to other CIA activities. Alsop stated, "The answer lies somewhere in the mystique of the secret-service professional *vis-à-vis* the amateur. Somehow in such a confrontation, the amateur tends to put a childish faith in the confident assertions of the professional." Similarly, Marilyn Berger in the May 26, 1973, *Washington Post* quoted a veteran intelligence official about his experiences in dealing with the 40 Committee: "They were like a bunch of schoolboys. They would listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I could get \$5 million out of the Forty Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the ordinary bureaucracy."

The 40 Committee process is further loaded in favor of the CIA because the agency prepares the proposals, and discussion is thereby within the CIA's terms of reference. The non-CIA members have no way of verifying that many of the agency's assertions and assumptions are correct, for example.

#### 6 LINES DELETED

The non-CIA members had to accept the agency's word that this program would have a chance of success. For security reasons, the specific people and methods that the CIA intends to use in a secret operation of this type are never included in the proposal. 40 Committee members can ask about the details at the actual meetings, but they have no way of knowing, without their own regional experts present, whether or not the CIA is providing them with self-serving answers.

In fact, much of the intelligence upon which the recommended intervention is based comes from the Clandestine

Services' own sources, and this mixing of the CIA's informational and operational functions can cause disastrous results, as occurred when the agency led the Kennedy administration to believe in 1961 that a landing of an exile military force would lead to a general uprising of the Cuban people. A more recent if less cataclysmic case occurred in 1970 when intervention in the Chilean elections was under government consideration. At

#### 9 LINES DELETED

the content of the report provided a strong argument for U.S. intervention to forestall Soviet gains. This report may or may not have been genuine. In either case, it was disseminated by the people in the Clandestine Services who favored intervention, and they were well aware of the effect it would have on the 40 Committee members. If, in this instance, the covert operators were not actually misleading the committee, they certainly could have been, and there was no way that any independent check could be made on them.

Until the 1967 disclosure of secret CIA funding of the National Student Association and scores of other ostensibly private organizations, the 40 Committee was called on only to give initial approval to covert-action programs. \* Thus, most CIA-penetrated and subsidized organizations went on receiving agency funds and other support year after year without any outside review, whatever of the continuing worthiness of the project. But the 1967 scandal caused the 40 Committee to revise its procedures so that all ongoing non-espionage operations were regularly reviewed. In these reviews, however, the committee is perhaps even more dependent on the CIA for information and guidance than

\* Final approval for a covert-action program is normally given by the 40 Committee chairman--still Henry Kissinger, even since he has become Secretary of State. He, in turn, notifies the President of what has been decided, and if there is a matter on which the committee was in disagreement, the chief executive makes the final decision. Although the President either reviews or personally authorizes all these secret interventions in other countries' internal affairs, he never signs any documents to that effect. Instead, the onus is placed on the 40 Committee, and if he chooses, the President can "plausibly deny" he has been involved in any illegal activities overseas.



with new programs. For unless there has been a public controversy, only the Clandestine Services usually know whether their efforts to subvert a particular organization or undermine a certain government have been successful. And the Clandestine Services would be unlikely to admit that their own operation was going badly, even if that were the case.

### 3 LINES DELETED

American officials hoped that through this "democratic front" Thieu could widen his political base by rallying various non-communist opposition elements to his camp. The effort was a resounding failure from the American point of view, since Thieu showed no interest in broadening his support—as long as the Vietnamese army and the U.S. government still supported him. Even though this was one of the few instances where the State Department, through its diplomatic reporting from Saigon,

### 5 LINES DELETED

Even Richard Bissell in his 1968 Council on Foreign Relations talk admitted that the 40 Committee "is of limited effectiveness." Bissell stated that if the committee were the only control instrument, he would "view it as, inadequate," but he believed that prior discussions on covert projects at working levels in the bureaucracy compensated for the failings of the "interdepartmental committee composed of busy officials who meet only once a week." To some extent what Bissell says is true, but he omits the fact that the most important projects, such as the Bay of Pigs, are considered so sensitive that the working levels outside the CIA are forbidden all knowledge of them. And he does not state that even when a few outside officials at the Assistant Secretary level or just below are briefed on covert operations, they are told the programs are so secret that they cannot talk to any of their colleagues about them, which prevents them from calling into play the bureaucratic forces usually needed to block another agency's projects. Furthermore, these officials, having been let in on the U.S. government's dirtiest and darkest activities, are often re-

luctant to do anything in opposition that will jeopardize their right to be told more secrets at a later time. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy in State and, to a much lesser extent, in Defense does have some effect in limiting the CIA's covert operations, although not nearly so much as Bissell claimed.

As previously mentioned, there is one CIA activity, classical espionage, over which there is no outside control—not from the 40 Committee, from the bureaucratic working level, nor from Congress. The Director of Central Intelligence has a statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and every DCI since Allen Dulles has taken this to mean that the CIA cannot inform any other government agencies of the identity of its foreign agents—the agency's most closely guarded secrets. While this secrecy in order not to jeopardize the lives of foreigners (or Americans) who spy for the CIA is understandable, the use of a particular agent can, sometimes have a political effect as large as, or larger than, a covert-action program. For example, if the CIA recruits a foreign official who is or becomes his country's Minister of Interior (e.g., Antonio Arguedas in Bolivia), then discovery of his connection to the agency can cause an international incident (as occurred in 1968 when Arguedas publicly admitted that he had worked for the CIA). In other instances, there have been Foreign Ministers and even Prime Ministers who were CIA agents, but the 40 Committee never was permitted to rule on whether or not the agency should continue its contact with them. Sometimes the CIA station chief in a particular country will advise the American ambassador that one of his agents is in a very high place in the local government or that he intends to recruit such a man, but the station chief does so at his own discretion.

The recruitment of lower-level foreigners can also have an important effect, especially if something goes wrong. This was the case in Singapore in 1960 (described in Chapter 9) when a CIA lie-detector expert blew a fuse, wound up in jail, caused the U.S. government to be subjected to blackmail, and damaged America's reputation overseas. The point to be noted is that since the CIA lie-detector man was putting a potential spy through the

"black box," his mission was part of an espionage operation and hence not subject to control outside the agency. Similarly, during the mid-1960s

#### 9 LINES DELETED

Prepared by the Pentagon's National Reconnaissance Office, the Joint Reconnaissance Schedule is always several inches thick and filled with hundreds of pages of highly technical data and maps. To a non-scientist, it is a truly incomprehensible collection of papers, and the staffs of the various 40 Committee members usually have only a day or two to look it over before the meetings. Under these conditions, the 40 Committee usually passes the schedule with little or no discussion. From time to time, the State Department will object to a particularly dangerous flight, such as sending an Air Force drone over South China subsequent to the American invasion of Cambodia, but nearly always missions—including the cruise of the *Liberty* (attacked by the Israelis during the 1967 Six Day War), the voyage of the spy ship *Pueblo* (captured by the North Koreans in 1968), and the flight of the EC-121 (shot down by the North Koreans in 1969)—are routinely approved.

#### 18 LINES DELETED

Even as the 40 Committee fails to keep a close watch on secret reconnaissance activities, is relatively ineffective in monitoring the CIA's covert operations, and is totally in the dark on espionage operations, President Nixon and especially Henry Kissinger are unquestionably aware of its shortcomings and have done little to change things. Institutionally, the committee could easily provide better control over American intelligence if its internal procedures were altered, if it were provided with an adequate staff, and if it could develop its own sources for information and evaluation independent of the agency's Clandestine Services. But it is the President and Kissinger who ultimately determine how the CIA operates, and if they do not want to impose closer control, then the *form* of the control mechanism is meaningless. The fact remains that both men believe in the need for the United States to use clandestine methods and "dirty tricks" in dealing with other countries, and the

current level and types of such operations obviously coincide with their views of how America's secret foreign policy should be carried out.

Therefore, as long as the CIA remains the President's loyal and personal tool to be used around the world at his and his top advisors' discretion, no President is likely, barring strong, unforeseen pressure, to insist that the agency's operations be brought under closer outside scrutiny.

#### *The PFIAB and the OMB*

In addition to the 40 Committee, the President has two other bodies in the executive branch which could conceivably assist him in controlling the CIA. One of these is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a group of eleven presidentially appointed private citizens who meet several times a year to evaluate the activities of the intelligence community and to make recommendations for needed change. President Eisenhower originally set up the PFIAB in 1956 under the chairmanship of Dr. James Killian of MIT, and its other heads have been General John Hull, Clark Clifford, General Maxwell Taylor, and, currently, retired Admiral George Anderson. The majority of its members have always been people with close ties to the Pentagon and defense contractors,\* and it has consistently pushed for bigger (and more expensive) intelligence collection systems.

The PFIAB meets approximately once a month in Washington, and is thus of limited value as a permanent watchdog committee. It is further handicapped by its status as an advisory group, with the resulting lack of bureaucratic authority. In general, the various members of the intelligence

\* In February 1974, the PFIAB's members in addition to Admiral Anderson were Dr. William Baker, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Vice President for Research; John Connally, former Governor of Texas and Secretary of the Navy and the Treasury; Leo Cherne, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America; Dr. John Foster, former Director of Defense Department Research and Engineering; Robert Galvin, President of Motorola; Gordon Gray, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Dr. Edwin Land, President of Polaroid; Clare Boothe Luce, former Congresswoman and ambassador; Nelson Rockefeller, former Governor of New York; and Dr. Edward Teller, nuclear physicist and "father of the hydrogen bomb."

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AGENCY

The Rise and Decline  
of the CIA

*John Ranelagh*



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Richard Helms, on the other hand, argues that proper reporting and authorizing procedures existed and were followed. From the earliest days of the agency, the 5412 Committee or its equivalent approved or disapproved operations to protect the President from direct involvement. "so that if something went sour and the President wanted to sacrifice all these fellows, they could be sacrificed because they were appointees. A President is elected for four years. We don't have a parliamentary system and you can't get rid of a President for having made a bad call, and therefore he has to be insulated from certain things." Concerning plausible denial, in other words, "It was not necessarily presidential authority that backed these things, it was the authority of these officials." Since "these officials"—the 5412 Committee or its equivalents—consisted of representatives of the secretaries of defense and state (or the secretaries themselves), the director of Central Intelligence and the President's national security adviser, it is a moot point whether it would be simply their authority behind CIA operations. As appointees, they enjoyed delegated presidential authority. However, in Helms's view, the agency would obtain its permission from this group and make periodical reports about operations as they took form and unfolded, "and certainly if there was a change in the administration, the agency would come back to make sure the operation was satisfactory to the new administration."

Helms, as a director of Central Intelligence who held office under two presidents, no doubt operated in this way. But in 1960 another DCI was in place and things may well have been different:

The agency says that the President is its sun, moon, and stars and that it does nothing without specific approval. That's what they told the new administration [said McGeorge Bundy], but what they never said was that there are some things you don't spell out. The two propositions don't hang together. You cannot really say you are the President's men and then say that of course there are some things we do for him that we don't tell him about. It was a careless or inaccurate reliance, if you like, looking back on it, on these assurances that was part of the trouble. I had that serene confidence that we knew what was going on until the assassination stories began to appear years later.

For Helms this was not quite the position, the 5412 Committee or its equivalents approved operations. If they did not approve an operation, then we would not attempt to carry it out. That is not to say that the national security adviser would not go up the back stairs and tell the President what we had decided to do and ask "Do you have any objections?" It was the committee's job to authorize, and it could always change its mind. Thinking back on the reporting system he remembered, McGeorge Bundy said:

There is a terrible danger that if you don't really listen extremely hard and have a relationship of mutual trust that is very close, you can get a situation

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cause of what had happened at the Bay of Pigs, the President wanted to be firmly in control of covert operations. This change was also brought about by the growing recognition that covert operations were no longer unusual or exceptional; they were commonly used in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and required higher-level control and review. Those involved in the control and review process remained the same as under Eisenhower. They included the President, his national security adviser, the Joint Chiefs, the secretaries of State and Defense or their representatives, the director of Central Intelligence, and various others who did not necessarily hold any official position in the administration. The **5412 Committee**, frequently referred to as the Special Group, since it was a subgroup of the National Security Council, continued but for only a short time. After April 1962 it basically ceased for the remainder of the Kennedy presidency.

In place of the **5412 Committee** came the Special Group on Counterinsurgency (CI) and the Special Group (Augmented). The Special Group (CI), established in January 1963, had only three members: General Maxwell Taylor, the President's military adviser; McGeorge Bundy, the President's assistant for national security affairs; and Robert Kennedy, the attorney general. The Special Group (Augmented) was set up after the Bay of Pigs and was responsible for only one operation, Mongoose, which it supervised until Mongoose ended in October 1962. During the seventeen months of its existence its members included Robert Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy, along with Roswell Gilpatric, deputy secretary of defense; U. Alexis Johnson, deputy undersecretary of state; General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Allen Dulles, followed by John McCone, as DCI.

As a result of these changes, procedures were streamlined, and control and authority were concentrated in the hands of Robert Kennedy, Taylor, and Bundy. This was further confirmed when during 1963, as covert operations multiplied in Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and Africa, the CIA was required to seek approval of all projects on a "cost and risk" basis. Until then the director of Central Intelligence, working within the guidelines and directives of the National Security Council, had the power to decide whether or not to submit a project for approval or review to the Special Group or the **5412 Committee**.

By 1960 the proliferation of operations and activities meant that within the agency, approvals were delegated to station chiefs and division chiefs under the deputy director for plans (until then either he or his assistant had personally approved every project) as a matter of administrative necessity. Cost and risk governed what the chiefs could approve without further referral, and only sensitive projects were referred to the DDP, his assistant, or the DCI. This was changed in 1963, and the Special Group (CI) took on the approval and reviewing function. No specific criteria were approved in writing, but the agency regarded twenty-five thousand dollars as a threshold cost for a project, and, as a matter of course, all projects at that level or above were submitted to the Special Group for approval.<sup>49</sup>