

**MSI PATCH SHEET** 

Typewriter Styles MJ12

### To whomever this may comeern:

This is a typing test made using my old Olympia model SG3 manual typewriter Shich dates from sometime in the late 1960's. I have used a sheet of standard 20 lb. bond paper under which I have placed, alternately, three sheets of carbon paper and three sheets of onionskin. The enionskin used is not just "thin" paper, but is actually onionskin paper of the type used in the Cutler-Twining memo. (Note that I said "type" here, NOT "brand".

The object of this test, which is being witnessed by two other persons, is to determine whether the type will actually "go through" the various layers, and if so, how far. I did not try this test in advance so as to "set-up" the situation— this is a FIRST TRY. Indeed, I just returned from the store only moments ago with the onionskin paper which is being used here.

I hope this test will serve to satisfy those who have claimed that the type does not shoe through on the other side of the paper in cases such as this.

Boscoptfully submitted,

William L. Moore

WITNESIEU G-28-87 HARA MARINE

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Respectfully guird sted.

William L. Moore

WITNESIEU G-28-57 Charlette

Harry Jan

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I hope this test will serve to satisfy those who have claimed that the type does not show through on the other side of the paper in cases such as this.

Respectfully submitted,

William L. Moore

WITNESIEU 9-28-87

Hand Die

EDITOR

Sept. 11, 1987

SHEET NO.

		CLE NO. o	SMEET NU. 0
	Mr. Mark Rodeghier		
,	COFOS 10 20 30 40	50 60	70
	Chicago, Ill. 60659		
1	Unicago, III. 000))		
_2	Dear Mark:		
3	In the recent CUFOS press release on the	e MJ-12 Controversy (bot	tom of
4	Page 2, it is claimed that impressions of type	pewriter keys can be see	n on
_ 5	the back side of an onionskin carbon copy whi	ich "can be tested by an	yone
6	with a manual typewriter."		
	I decided to conduct such a test, using	a 22-year old Hermes 30	00
8	portable typewriter which has never been repa	aired or serviced	·
_ 9	And this letter is the product of that t	test.	
10	QUESTION: Are the key impressions visible	le to you on the back si	de
11	of the carbon copy??		
12	Sincerely,		
<u>13</u>		5 10	, l
14		2 NON	A
, 15			
16			
<u>-1</u> -j\	WOTE to those who receive a photo-copy:		
	The above was typed on an Aviation Weetsists of a moderately thin top sheet, with and a second, thin onionskin sheet.		
20	This "NOTE" was typed with a Canon \$-169	S daisy wheel typewrite	er.
21	•		
2.2			
Additional No.	te: This is a type test of my old manual Ol by William L. Moore, 9/28/87.	ympia SM5(correction:	SG3) model (
24	K, 11) A.	May In	· family
_25	Marini 1	WITNESSED	The state of the s
		VV 1 1 10 0 80 WV	

55-21400

Mr. Mark Rodeghier COFOS 2457 V. Peterson Ave. Chicago, Ill. 60659

Dear Mark:

In the recent CUFOS press release on the MJ-12 Controversy (bottom of Page 2, it is claimed that impressions of typewriter keys can be seen on the back side of an onionskin carbon copy which "can be tested by anyone with a manual typewriter."

I decided to conduct such a test, using a 22-year old Hermes 3000 portable typewriter which has never been repaired or serviced.

And this letter is the product of that test.

QUESTION: Are the key <u>impressions</u> visible to you on the <u>back</u> side of the carbon copy??

Sincerely,

NOTE to those who receive a photo-copy:

The above was typed on an Aviation Week manuscript paper which consists of a moderately thin top sheet, with attached sheet of carbon paper and a second, thin onionskin sheet.

This "NOTE" was typed with a Canon S-16S daisy wheel typewriter. .

Additional Note: This is a type test of my old manual Olympia 845 (correction: SG3) model.


Typed by William L. Moore, 9/28/87.

WITNESSED



2457 W. Peterson Ave. Chicago, IL 60659

Olive St., Suite 247 CA 91505 Moore



### AUTHENTIC CUTLER TYPEWRITER SAMPLES NOTE SMALL (ELITE) TYPEFACE.

May 21, 1953

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

THE MJ-12 CUTLER-TWINING MEMO ALLEGEDLY WRITTEN WHEN CUILER WAS OUT-OF-COUNTRY.

May 25, 1953

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

Philip J. Klass Dec. 17, 1988

ptember 22, 1953

ECBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

Because Cutler was out of country on July 14, 1954, Friedman suggests the memo was written by James S. Lay, Jr.

July 3, 1954

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

April 22, 1953

ROBERT CUTLER

But Lay's type-face differs from Cutler/Twining memo--even on same day that memo allegedly was typed.

LAY DID WRITE A MEMO ON JULY 14, 1954, and the type-face is Elite (small), not Pica (large) as in suspect memo.

Merch 15, 1954

JAMES S. LAY, JR. Executive Secretary

July 14. 1954

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

CUTLER MEMO" reportedly found in National Archives by Moore & Shandera NOTE LARGE (PICA) TYPEFACE

July 14, 1954

James 5. Lay, Jr. Executive Secretary

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant July 21, 1954 to the President

Notes by STF, Jan. 20, 1989

Obviously Klass has a limited sample.. just in my files I found copies of many PICA type memos from Lay dating back to 1947.. even cases of different type on memos written the same date. Yet another red herring

March 8, 1955

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant by the chief red herring gatherer. Propagandists to the President usually have problems dealing with facts.

> PS, PK's philosophy has always been "Don't bother me with the facts , my mind is made up"

Robert Cutler Special Assistant

to the President

NOTE transition of Cutler's office to a new typewriter in 1953-54--using same typeface as Lay's machine--BUT different from machine used to type "Cutler Memo" of July 14, 1954.

July 31, 1957

Notes by STF, January 20, 1989

Procedures, format of memos, etc... which is not surprising considering his unwillingness to visit or spend much time at Archival repositories. Anybody who does spend the time, as I have, knows full well that the Lay and Cutler offices had many different typewriters, formats, etc.

Klass has once again demonstrated his ignorance of office procedures, some surprising considering his unwillingness to PHILIP J. KLASS

WASHINGTON D. C. 20024

(202) 554-5901

different typewriters, formats, etc.

Different typewriters were even used on the same day. STF)

January 16, 1989

S. Terry Friedman
79 Pembroke Crescent
Fredericton, N.B. E3B 2V1
Canada

SUBJECT: MJ-12/White House Typewriters

Because you are so far behind in responding to my queries, especially mine of Nov. 28 seeking your appraisal of "Falcon" and "Condor"--Moore and Shandera's "high-level intelligence sources"---I'll try to ease your workload.

My letter of Dec. 24 was intended to motivate you to examine the typeface of known-to-be-authentic letters written by Robert Cutler and James Lay during the 1953-55 period and to compare that typeface with the <u>alleged</u> Cutler/Twining memo of July 14, 1954. My four questions, seemingly rhetorical ones, in reality were a mixed bag designed to check your powers of observation, i.e. some deserved a "No" and some a "Yes."

Let me try a more direct approach which could put up to \$1,000 (U.S.) in your pocket. Enclosed is a representative sample of typefaces used by Cutler and Lay's offices during the 1953-57 period, layed out for easy comparison with that used in the alleged Cutler/Twining memo of July 14, 1954.

House executives used the smaller Elite typeface. But the alleged Cutler/Twining memo of July 14 uses the larger Pica typeface.

I challenge you to produce known-to-be-authentic White House/business letters/memoranda written by Cutler or Lay during the 1953-55 time period which uses a typeface identical in size and style to that used in the alleged Cutler/Twining memo of July 14, 1954.

Why not 1947 on Lay joined McCim 1947,

To provide motivation for your prompt response for an article I plan to write, I herewith offer to pay you \$100 for each such letter you can provide in the next 60 days, with an upper limit of \$1,000 if you supply 10 different letters that meet the above conditions.

One would think I was under an obligation Sincerely, to do Klass's homework for him and to respond to all his assinine questions despite his ad hominem attacks, total inability to focus on the relevant data, etc...

Who decides what is identical??

I immediately found PICA type on memos going back to 1947... As usual Klass suffers from hoof in mouth disease.

STF -

La over

All items E = Elite Type P = Pica from S.T.Ffiles December 19, 1947 D November 7, 1951 Executive Secretary JAMES S. LAY, JR. Assistant Executive Secretary November 7, 1951 JAMES S. LAY, Jr. 01443 Executive Secretary July 21, 1953 JAMES S. LAL, D. Executive Secretary December 19, 1947 JAMES S. LAY, JR. Assistant Executive Secretary August 18, 1954 ROBERT CUTLER JAMES S. LAY, Jr. Executive Secretary Special Assistant January 2, 1951 to the President June 1, 1954 January 4, 1951 JAMES S. LAY, JR. Executive Secretary NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TENTATIVE AGENDA - MAY 31-JULY 2 JAMES S. LAY, Jr. P January 5, 1951 Executive Secretary June 4, 1954 Julian II. Jak, Jil. Executive Secretary E duntary 5, 1951 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TENTATIVE AGENDA - JUNE 4-JULY 2 JAMES S. LAY, Jr. P Executive Secretary January 16, 1951 June 14, 1954 P February 2, 1951 MATTHEW J. CONNELLY Secretary to the President NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL JAMES S. LAY, JR. TENTATIVE AGENDA - JUNE 14-JULY 9 February 12, 1951 Executive Secretary June 18, 1954 JAMES S. LAY, Jr. P February 19, 1951 F 4 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Executive Secretary JAMES S. LAY, Jr. p April 10, 1951 TENTATIVE AGENDA - JUNE 18-JULY 23 Executive Secretary June! 26, 1954 P JAMES S. LAY, Jr. P June 18, 1951 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Executive Secretary Auno 19, 1951 TENTATIVE AGENDA - JUNE 28-JULY 30 JAMES S. LAY, Jr. Executive Secretary July 6, 1954 June 19, 1951 JAMES S. LAY, Jr. P NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Executive Secretary

July 30, 1952

August 3, 1951

October 26, 1951

Minis S. LAY, Jr. F.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr. F. Boscoutive Secretary

JAMES S. LAY, Jr. L. Executive Secretary

TENTATIVE AGENDA - JULY 6-30

July 13, 195+ Note: Feb 19, 1951; 46/19

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .

TENTATIVE AGENDA - JULY 12-AUGUST 6

This is a quick a dirty response to an iname charge by P.Klass. There is far more evidence. ST. Friedman Jan 20,1989

### STANTON T. FRIEDMAN **NUCLEAR PHYSICIST - LECTURER**

79 PEMBROKE CRESCENT FREDERICTON, NEW BRUNSWICK E3B 2V1 CANADA

(506) 457-0232

Philip J. Klass 404 "N" St. Southwest Washington, DC 20024 USA

January 20, 1989

Subject:MJ-12/White House Typewriters

Reference: Your completely inane comments of January 16, 1989

The postman must have known how pleased I would be to get yet another example of your ineptness as an MJ-12 document researcher since it only took 4 days to get your silly material here. One might hope that you would have learned a lesson from all your previous inept attacks.. Material, date formats, wrong info on Gray, Bush, Souers, etc ad nauseum. I guess one can't teach some old dogs new tricks.

It is truly outrageous for you to suggest you were testing my powers of observation when I had already noted how many different type styles and formats there are in White House items.

How do you dare speak of a tradition of using elite type at the White House? Just how much White House material have you examined? The Ike Lib. alone has 250,000 pages of NSC material. The National Archives has loads as well, but I guess it is too far for you.

I am enclo sing copies straight from my files of various Lay and Cutler material.. first ones at hand, but just the tip of the iceberg. You will note that PICA is quite common, that on June 19,1951 Lay signed both PICA and ELITE memos, that onFeb. 19 the date was ELITE and the memo and sign off PICA. As usual you are flat out wrong because YOU DO NOT DO YOUR HOMEWORK AND ARE NOT INTERESTED IN TRUTH.

I do appreciate your giving me 60 days.. not that it is needed, but I will be out at the TRUMAN and IKE libraries again within a few weeks and they usually take some time to make copies.

You don't seem to be aware that Cutler and Lay were master paper pushers handling huge amounts of classified material. They obviously kept many typewriters busy.

I look forward to your check and will not charge you for copying the various memos. I would be happy to play the same game again... after all why stop at ten examples when there are so many. It is finally about time you put some money where your mouth is. How about 200\$ @ for the next ten examples?? Make my day. Maybe \$300.0 for the next 10??

Stanton T. Friedman, searcher for truth.

PS. If you were a careful observer seeking truth you would have noted that I long ago sent you copies of Truman's Appointment calendar for Sept. 26, 1947 and Aug. 25, 1949, bothlisting ROSCOE Hillenkoetter and both typed with PICA type.

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TWINING

SUBJECT: NSC/MJ-12 Special Studies Project

The President has decided that the MJ-12 SSP briefing should take place during the already scheduled white House meeting of July 16, rather than following it as previously intended. More precise arrangements will be explained to you upon arrival. Please alter your plans accordingly.

Your concurrence in the above change of arrangements is assumed.

> ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

from

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

RO 341, Records of the Headquarters United

Record Group No. Statos Air Force

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### EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

COPY NO.\_\_1

April 30, 1954



MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT:

Review of Current National Security Policies

Adopted Prior to 1953

REFERENCE:

NSC Action No. 1081

The NSC Planning Board has reviewed current national security policies adopted prior to 1953 in order to determine which of these policies, not presently under review, should be reviewed and which are no longer current. The results of the Planning Board's review are reflected in the enclosed list which is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council. This list does not include any policy adopted or revised in the period since January, 1953.

In the absence of objection the Planning Board will undertake to review those policies listed under category II in the enclosure, as well as those now under review in III.

> JAMES S. LAY, Jr Executive Secretar

cc:

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

**DECLASSIFIED** 

Authority MR 81-320#/

### EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 1

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**DECLASSIFIED** 

Authority MR 81-320#/

TOP SECRET REST

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TWINING

MSC/MJ-12 Special Studies Project

The President has decided that the MJ-12 35P briefing should take place during the already scheduled white House meeting of July 16, rather than fellowing it as previously intended. More precise arrangements will be explained to you upon arrival. Please alter your plans accordingly.

18 assumed. Your concurrence in the above change of arrangements

## TOP SECR.

# EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 1

April 30, 1954



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## TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

September 24, 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


Dear Secretary Forrestal:

speed and caution upon your undertaking.
this matter shall be referred to only as
Majestic Twelve. As per our recent conversation on this matter, hereby authorized to proceed with all due Operation Hereafter

It continues to be my feeling that any future considerations relative to the ultimate disposition of this matter should rest solely with the Office of the President following appropriate discussions with yourself, Dr. Bush and the Director of Central ntelligence.

American Southwest from eastern Arizona to West Texas, their color, and following high trajectories over a large area of the 1948 -- no one seems certain just when. By the time they attthey were almost epidemic. Silent, usually brilliant green in racted the attention of military and governmental authorities, Whatever they were, people began seeing them sometime in

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AGENC. XXXXX

district frankly

mr. Lan

6 aug-1948 ..

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The immediate objective of the USSR, in agreeing to enter into negotiations on Germany, is probably to:
(a) ease present international tension; and (b) exploit the ourrent dilemma of the western powers by seeking an agreement on terms which would offer the Kremlin certain strategic advantages in return for tactical concessions.


was proceed to the way was a second

If the Soviet representatives become convinced that the vestern powers are unwilling to accept minimum Soviet demands, the USSR will probably proceed to utilize the proposed confarence: (a) to retard the western program for "containment" of the USSR; (b) to promote dissension among the western powers; and (c) to provide a sounding board for Soviet propaganda which would seek to interpret soviet willingness to negotiate as proof of Moscow's "poscoful intentions" and the failure to reach agreement as proof of western intransizence.

It is believed that in such negotiations the maximum Soviet objectives would be substantially as follows: (a) deliveries of German plant reparations and reparations from current production; (b) the Soviet concept of demilitarisation of Germany; (c) the formation of a national German Government; (d) a peace treaty for Germany; and (e) four-power control of the Rubre

Although the USSR would, during the early stages of the discussion, press vigorously for western concessions on all of the foregoing points in order to create for itself the strongest possible bargaining position, it is believed that it would be willing to settle for considerably more modest terms, because of its longer range and more important objective of having a voice in the government of all of Germany as well as in the councils of the western European nations. Such minimum Soviet terms will

111 85-43 (CEA LITE TO DAY 1-12-80)



probably be governed by the following general sims:
(a) to prevent the economic and political stabilization of western Europe, of which western Germany is the key; and (b) to obtain for the Soviet sphere economic benefits from western Germany.

In the pursuit of the two foregoing objectives, the USSR may be expected to insist on the following minimum terms: (a) suspension by the western powers of final establishment of a west German Government; (b) resumption of scheduled reparations deliveries from western Germany through the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency; and (c) some share in the production of western German industry, including some voice in the sconomic administration of the Ruhr.

In seeking agreement on the foregoing terms, the USSR may be expected to offer a number of concessions designed to conciliate the western powers and pave the way toward German unity. These concessions will involve some relaxation of Soviet controls in eastern Germany and probably will include a re-affirmation of western rights in and access to Berlin. Soviet negotiators, however, will take care to insure that such concessions do not impair the long-term capability of the USSR to dominate eastern Germany, including Berlin.

Wostern power acceptance of minimum Soviet terms would probably lead to a temporary agreement on Germany. This would give the USSR a breathing spell, enabling it:

(a) to improve the economy of Germany's eastern Zone as well as that of eastern Europe; (b) to tighten political controls over the satellite states; (c) to conduct peace-offensive propaganda; and (d) to exploit western power differences in order to weaken the present anti-Soviet western coalition. Western Europe in general would welcome an agreement which afforded a temporary relaxation in present east-west tension, while the USSR may hope to profit by agitation for national unity in Germany.

The US would thus be in effect gambling that the cumulative effects of the ERP and other measures that the western powers may take will more than outweigh the



MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT ON SEPTEMBER 24:

Secretary Forrestal and I visited the President at 11:30 a.m. I opened the conversation after the usual greetings by stating that Mr. Forrestal wished me to take the post of Chairman of the Research and Development Board, and the President immediately said "so do I." I then told the President that while I would like to be relieved after some seven years of voluntary government effort, I would nevertheless be willing to go on and do the job, but that one thing seemed to stand in the way. I told him that I could not do the job appropriately and call in the needed aid from outside government unless the scientists in particular in the country felt that I had the confidence of the President. The President said he did not see how they could think otherwise, that I certainly had his confidence and that this was indicated by the fact that he wished me to take on the post, and he inquired how any other idea could have arisen. I told him that inasmuch as he had not called me in for anything for a year, and that since the last report was made on the future of science in this country was made by someone else, scientists naturally gathered that I was not in his confidence. There ensued a discussion of the manner in which the Steelman report was handled, and I believe that the President had not realized previously that the board he set up really had nothing to do with the preparation of the Steelman report. However, he stated that certainly in the new post, if it had not been true recently in the past, I would be rather frequently in contact and that if there was an impression that I did not have his confidence he felt that that impression would soon be corrected by future relations. I then told the President that I felt that this time I ought to take the post with the definite understanding that I would relinquish it in about a year or perhaps less. We had some discussion of this and he finally agreed that it would be a good thing, after the Board was well on its way, to revolve the chairmanship at reasonable intervals. talked about possible successors. Mr. Forgestal led this part of the discussion and stated that he felt that before the end of my term of office he and I ought to seek a successor agreeable to the President and see that he was indoctrinated.

We also discussed the science legislation. At first the President was very positive on this subject, and indicated that he felt that Congress had tried to take out of his control things that reasonably belong under his control. He ballmed the fiasco on Senator Smith, but I explained to him that Smith had, in fact,



October 18, 1987

Dear Bill,

Here are the originals of your typewriter test as requested. Keep up the good work.

Library and Publication Sales

Best regards,



### WILLIAM L. MOORE PUBLICATIONS & RESEARCH 4219 WEST OLIVE ST., SUITE Nº 247, BURBANK, CA. 91505

WILLIAM L. MOORE BRYAN T. REID PHONE: [818] 506-8365

Date: 28 Sept. 187

To whomever this may concern:

This is a typing test made using my old Olympia model SG3 manual typewriter which dates from sometime in the late 1960's. I have used a sheet of standard 20 lb. bond paper under which I have placed, alternately, three sheets of carbon paper and three sheets of onionskin. The onionskin used is not just "thin" paper, but is actually onionskin paper of the type used in the Cutler-Twining memo. (Note that I said "type" here, NOT "brand".)

The object of this test, which is being witnessed by two other persons, is to determine whether the type will actually "go through" the various layers, and if so, how far. I did not try this test in advance so as to "set-up" the situation—this is a FIRST TRY. Indeed, I just returned from the store only moments ago with the onionskin paper which is being used here.

I hope this test will serve to satisfy those who have claimed that the type does not show through on the other side of the paper in cases such as this.

Respectfully submitted,

William L. Moor

WITNESIED

Jan Market